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User behavior is one of the most significant information security risks. Information Security
is all about being aware of who and what to trust and behaving accordingly. Due to
technology becoming an integral part of nearly everything in people's daily lives, the
organization's need for protection from security threats has continuously increased. Social
engineering is the act of tricking a user into revealing information or taking action. One of
the riskiest aspects of social engineering is that it depends mainly upon user errors and is not
necessarily a technology shortcoming. User behavior should be one of the first apprehensions
when it comes to social engineering. Unfortunately, there are few specific studies to
understand factors that affect users' information security protection behavior towards social
engineering breaches.
The focus of the information security literature is shifting from technology to user behavior
in recent times. SETA (Security Education Training Awareness) program aids organizations
in teaching their users about information security issues and expectations to prevent
information security breaches. Information security policies depict the rules and regulations
that everyone must follow utilizing an organization's information technology resources. This
research study used Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) combined with the SETA program
and security policies to determine factors that affect users' information security protection
behavior towards social engineering breaches. This research study was an empirical and
quantitative study to congregate data utilizing a web survey and PLS-SEM (Partial Least
Squares Structural Equation Modeling) technique. As a result, the research study supported
all three hypotheses associated with fear, including a positive impact of perceived severity on
fear, perceived vulnerability on fear, and fear on protection motivation. Moreover, the
research study substantiated the positive impact of perceived severity, perceived
vulnerability, and response efficacy on protection motivation. Furthermore, the research
study also confirmed the positive impact of protection motivation and the SETA program on
protection behavior.
The findings of this research study derived that, unswerving with the literature, social
engineering has arisen as one of the biggest threats in information security. This research
study explored factors impacting users' information security protection behavior towards
social engineering breaches. Support of all hypotheses for fear appeal is a substantial

contribution in view of a lesser-researched fear appeal in preceding research using PMT. This
research study provided the groundwork for encouraging and nurturing users' information
security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Finally, this research
study contributes to the increasing phenomenon of social engineering in practice and future
research.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Background
Information Security
Society, organizations, and governments have become increasingly reliant on information
technology (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2008; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Siponen &
Vance, 2014). Moreover, information security breaches, a murkier side of information
technology, are tough to identify, impeach, and become more sophisticated due to technology
advancements (D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 2014; Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012; Ifinedo, 2014). As
the attacking techniques are getting more automated, hacking tools are increasingly available
free of charge, and besides, skills required to perform attacks are becoming lesser significant
(Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Straub &
Welke, 1998).
Social Engineering
Scholars have defined social engineering as "the psychological manipulation of people in
order to gain access to a system for which the attacker is not authorized" (Bhakta & Harris,
2015, p. 424). Social engineering is a technique used to manipulate users steered by a
cybercriminal to access confidential information or executing an action to enable a
cyberattack (Alazri, 2015; Osuagwu & Chukwudebe, 2015). Social engineering (SE) is a
crucial area of information security. Social Engineering manipulates people to compromise
information security (Brody, Brizzee, & Cano, 2012; Malfaz & Salichs, 2011; Tetri &
Vuorinen, 2013). Users are considered the weakest link in information security (Butler, 2007;
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Dinev & Hu, 2007; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Social engineering attackers begin with the
target or their associate obtaining specific physical and emotional attributes of a person
(Heartfield & Loukas, 2015; Mansfield-Devine, 2016; Meguerdichian, Koushanfar, Qu, &
Potkonjak, 2001). Social engineers target people who have access to systems or other people,
persuading them into revealing confidential information or influencing them to carry out
steps for the attacks (Brody et al., 2012; Bullée, Montoya, Pieters, Junger, & Hartel, 2015;
Heartfield & Loukas, 2015).
Information security attacks and information misuse result in significant financial losses
to users, businesses, government, and organizations (D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009;
Herath & Rao 2009a; Saleem, 1996). Social engineering has emerged as a severe threat due
to a shortage of visibility about information collected by social engineering attacks combined
with an exponential increase of risk associated with social engineering (Acquisti,
Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). A
social engineering attacker can use the most prominent instrument of manipulating people
into giving organizational information (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992; McCoy, Park, Shi, &
Jakobsson, 2016; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013).
It is possible to execute social engineering on a large scale, and multinational companies
and government organizations are victims of these attacks (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011;
McCoy et al., 2016). Accordingly, organizations design and implement SETA (Security
Education Training Awareness) program and security policies for security awareness
training, ongoing communication of security policies, reminders for changing passwords,
spreading mindfulness of penalties involved in security misuse, and prompt response
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cognizance in case of a social engineering breach (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; Straub
& Welke, 1998).
Protection Behavior
Every time users interact with technology, there is a possibility of a user error (Boss et al.,
2009; Lebek, Uffen, Neumann, Hohler, & Breitner, 2014; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009).
However, what is thought-provoking is that every user could fall for a social engineering
attack (Cram, Proudfoot, & D'Arcy, 2017; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Straub, 1990).
Notwithstanding all technological advances in information security, user behavior plays an
important part, as most users do not comprehend how to safeguard critical information and
digital assets (Komatsu, Takagi, & Takemura, 2013; Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, &
Courtney, 2013; Straub & Welke, 1998). Nonetheless, information security technology alone
is not sufficient to mitigate information security risks; protection behavior remains a central
aspect in information security and should not be underestimated (Cram, Proudfoot, &
D'Arcy, 2017; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Straub & Welke, 1998).
Problem Statement
Social engineering attacks defraud executives out of the organization's money and results
in substantial financial losses for a significant number of organizations (Brody et al., 2012;
Zweighaft, 2017). Therefore, this study addressed the research problem by identifying factors
impacting users' information security protection behavior towards social engineering
breaches. This research study was built on previous research by Hong and Thong (2013) and
Wolff (2016), who recommended that social engineering risks, threats, features, actions, and
responses need significant attention. There is an increasing need to protect organizations
from ongoing threats and prevent social engineering attacks (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011;
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Bullée et al., 2015). At the same time, social engineering breaches continue to increase in
complexity and impact (Bullée et al., 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).
Social engineering breaches can be disastrous for an organization's brand image and
reputation in the industry (Goode, Hoehle, Venkatesh, & Brown, 2017). Bélanger and
Crossler (2011) cautioned that organizational resources are reactive to social engineering
breaches rather than proactive. Even though many social engineering risks result in financial
losses, organizations are under-secured, the social engineering problem has remained underresearched and unresolved (Jakobsson, 2016; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Thus, there is an
imperative need to comprehend and examine countermeasures and means to prevent social
engineering risks (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012).
Social engineers manipulate users into giving information (Krombholz, Hobel, Huber, &
Weippl, 2015; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). Users' usage and a violation of security policies can
breach security (Benson, Saridakis, & Tennakoon, 2015). Internal user behavior was the
cause of 34% of security breaches (McCormac, Zwaans, Parsons, Calic, Butavicius, &
Pattinson, 2017). Technical actions alone are insufficient to safeguard an organization's
information security (InfoSec); there is a more significant emphasis required on the human
aspects of InfoSec (McCormac et al., 2017). While users are among the leading causes of
security breaches, insider threats are not easy to avoid and prevent (Wang, Gupta, & Rao,
2015). Algarni, Xu, and Chan (2017), Bullée et al. (2015), as well as Heartfield and Loukas
(2015) recommended that users' information security protection behavior towards social
engineering breaches need additional attention and research.
Despite what the prior research studies have explored and resolved, social engineering is
still a significant problem (Algarni et al., 2017; Kaushalya, Randeniya, & Liyanage, 2018).
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Numerous studies focused on various aspects of social engineering. Nevertheless, most of
these studies have not engrossed in users' behavioral responses to the imposed social
engineering attacks. There was a discrepancy in the existing research on users' beliefs and
perceptions that impact their behavioral responses to social engineering attacks. Previous
studies had not explored factors that influence users' information security protection behavior
towards social engineering breaches.
Therefore, it appeared that additional investigation on factors that affect users' information
security protection behavior towards social engineering breaches was necessary (Algarni et
al., 2017; Kaushalya et al., 2018). Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, and Polak (2015) proposed
using fear appeals in the PMT to motivate users and deter information security breaches.
There was a solid need for further exploration and research on well-formulated SETA
program and well-aligned security policies for the overall IS (information systems) strategy
to keep organizational information assets and resources safe from dire attacks (D'Arcy &
Hovav, 2007; Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003; Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004). There was no
published research to determine the effects of perceived severity, perceived vulnerability,
fear, maladaptive rewards, response efficacy, self-efficacy, perceived response costs, SETA
program, security policies, and protection motivation on users' information security
protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches using PMT.
Dissertation Goal
This research study's main goal was to perform an empirical verification of the factors
contributing to users' information security protection behavior. This research study developed
a model that entails the full nomology of Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) combined
with the SETA program and security policies to test the hypotheses on the constructs.
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Additionally, this research study developed an integrated SETA program and security
policies model under the umbrella of PMT theory full nomology (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011). It
assisted in cumulative theory-building initiatives to improve the information security arena
and prevent social engineering breaches (Herath & Rao, 2009b).
Initially discovered by Rogers (1975), PMT has become a gold standard for health-related
behavior research, discovery, and exploration. PMT was originally established to elucidate
the impacts of fear appeals on health motivation and behaviors (Rogers, 1975). PMT shows
how individuals are inspired to respond to dangerous situations, named fear appeals (Boss et
al., 2015). PMT describes that individuals use a cognitive process combining threat and
coping appraisals to interpret and respond to dangerous situations (Boss et al., 2015).
PMT was adapted to understand what motivates individuals to adopt security policies
(Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015) and espouse authentication services (Yang, Zhang,
& Lanting, 2017). PMT has been utilized to exhibit online privacy protection behavior (Chai,
Bagchi-Sen, Morrell, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2009) and employ anti-malware software
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee & Larsen, 2009).
There are various enhancements and extensions implemented in the information security
field over time. PMT has core nomology and full nomology. The PMT core nomology is the
same as the full nomology, except that core nomology does not include the two constructs,
fear and maladaptive rewards (Boss et al., 2015). Boss et al. (2015) found that "typically,
ISec studies omit core PMT concepts or fear-appeal manipulations without explanation" (p.
9). Boss et al. (2015) argued that the misrepresentation of the PMT presents a substantial
issue for information security researchers as such:
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Our careful review of the foundation for PMT identified three opportunities for
improving ISec PMT research. First, extant ISec studies do not use the full nomology
of PMT constructs. Second, only one study uses fear-appeal manipulations, even
though these are a core element of PMT, and virtually no ISec study models or
measures fear. Third, whereas these studies have made excellent progress in
predicting security intentions, none of them have addressed actual security behaviors
(p. 2).
This research study, therefore, utilized the full nomology of PMT to develop its research
model. It was worthwhile to further investigate the PMT in combination with the SETA
program and security policies in the context of social engineering.
Research Model
PMT is a valuable groundwork for explaining how individuals use a cognitive method to
decide security behavior to respond to insecure conditions (Boss et al., 2015). It offers a
comprehensive understanding of why individuals may not execute recommended protective
behaviors against social engineering threats (Herath & Rao, 2009b). This understanding
improves educational, training, and awareness resources to respond to social engineering
breaches (Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008). Although the information security domain utilized
PMT widely, there was an additional need for empirical research studies performed in social
engineering (Lee & Larsen, 2009; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). This research model utilized
PMT in social engineering (Crossler, Johnston, Lowry, Hu, Warkentin, & Baskerville, 2013).
Although the extant research studies in the information security area used many PMT
concepts, most of them did not use the full nomology of PMT (Boss et al., 2015). In the
information security literature, researchers have incorporated PMT by utilizing fragments of it
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(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Extant research studies omitted constructs from the full
nomology of PMT (Liang & Xue, 2010). Previous research studies omitted constructs such
as response costs and maladaptive rewards, missing out on utilizing the benefit of full
nomology of PMT (Alashoor, Han, & Joseph, 2017). This research study utilized the full
nomology of PMT to incorporate comprehensive analysis and understand the impact of every
construct (Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 2000).
PMT is logically suitable for information security research where fear inspires users to
exhibit protection behaviors (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). Fear provocation happens as a
retort to circumstances adjudicated as unsafe and protective behavior is exhibited to prevent
it (Rogers 1975). PMT includes fear and provides information about users’ ability to cope
with the threat in a productive way (Floyd et al., 2000). Neglecting fear from the information
security research study utilizing PMT could weaken the results; hence, this study included
fear in the research model (Boss et al., 2015).
Many information security research utilizing PMT used protection motivation as the
research model’s dependent construct (Boss et al., 2015). PMT can predict both protection
motivation and protection behavior, as reinforced by Sommestad, Karlzén, and Hallberg
(2015). Extant research studies utilizing PMT in the health area have addressed actual
behaviors in addition to intentions (Milne et al., 2000). Actual behaviors and intentions need
to be studied for social engineering because behaviors also need to be improved and not just
intentions (Boss et al., 2015). This research study went beyond protection motivation and
incorporated the relationship between protection motivation and protection behavior to
prevent social engineering breaches (Floyd et al., 2000).
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To carry out security policy and increase protection behaviors of users, organizations
implement a comprehensive SETA program (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011; Johnston et al., 2015).
Nurturing a security culture that inspires robust and well-aligned SETA program and security
policies should help reduce information misuse and increase protection behavior in the
workplace (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Herath & Rao 2009b). Therefore, this research model
analyzed the impacts of SETA program and security policies on protection behavior to
prevent security engineering breaches.
The cognitive mediating method comprises of two distinct processes: the threat appraisal
process (perceptions of how endangered an individual feels) (Liang & Xue, 2009) and the
coping appraisal process (perceptions of the recommended coping response to the danger)
(Floyd et al., 2000). This research study made use of PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers,
1975), which propositions that an individual’s perceived vulnerability and the severity will
influence the level of fear experienced.
Fear and rewards will influence the execution of behaviors to protect against danger.
These factors make the threat appraisal component of the model. Furthermore, response
efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs will influence an individual’s protection
motivation to perform protection behaviors. These factors make the coping appraisal
component of the model. The anticipated paybacks of not executing protection behaviors
against social engineering threats and the expected costs to be experienced by executing
protection behaviors may negatively influence users’ protection motivation.
Threat appraisal in this research model includes fear appeal (how individuals respond to
unsafe circumstances) (Milne et al., 2000), maladaptive rewards (paybacks from not
exhibiting the protection behavior) (Slovic & Peters, 2006), perceived severity (individual
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judging the scale of the danger) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983), and perceived vulnerability
(individual deciding own susceptibility to the danger) (Liang & Xue, 2010). The coping
appraisal includes response efficacy (the individual's belief in the perceived effectiveness of
the protective action) (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010), response cost (perceived cost to the
individual in exhibiting the protection behavior) (Rogers, 1975), and self-efficacy (the
individual's belief in own capability to exhibit the protection behavior) (Herath & Rao,
2009b).
The research model included eleven constructs that determine the users' information
security protection behavior towards social engineering breaches. Four of these constructs,
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear, and maladaptive rewards, made up the user's
threat appraisal. Response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs made up the user's
coping appraisal. This research model went beyond the nomological model of the PMT by
introducing vital precursors SETA program and security policies. The SETA program and
security policies were two additional constructs utilized in addition to PMT constructs.
Figure 1 shows the proposed research model.
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Figure 1: Proposed Research Model
Research Question
This research study addressed the following main research question:
RQ: What are the factors influencing the users' information security protection behavior
towards social engineering breaches?
Hypotheses
In this research study, perceived severity signified the brutality of the social engineering
breach and the possible losses caused by the organization's breach. PMT accentuates the
impacts created by persuasive communications to influence people's behavior in a
determined manner (Rogers, 1975). Similarly, the scope of PMT includes factors that
influence motivation that, in turn, affect behavior (Rogers, 1975). In this research study, a
social engineering breach is considered the users' perceived threat. The PMT suggested that
perceived severity directly affects fear (Rogers, 1975). The higher the threat's perception to
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be more serious, the higher the fear appeal for the danger (Maddux & Rogers, 1983).
Correspondingly, the more severe the threat to a user is, the more fear the user would enthuse
(Milne et al., 2000). Boss et al. (2015) noted that there is a positive relationship between
perceived severity and fear. Therefore, hitherto background and the positive association
between perceived severity and fear resulted in the following hypothesis:
H1: Perceived severity is positively associated with fear.
In this research study, perceived vulnerability signified users' assessment of whether their
organization was susceptible to social engineering breaches without following security
measures. The PMT suggested that perceived vulnerability directly impacted fear (Floyd et
al., 2000; Marett, McNab, & Harris, 2011). The higher the perception of threat likely to
happen, the higher the users' emotional response towards the threat (Floyd et al., 2000). Boss
et al. (2015) noted a positive relationship between perceived vulnerability and fear.
Consequently, the background up until now and the positive association between perceived
vulnerability and fear gave rise to the following hypothesis:
H2: Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with fear.
Fear is a negative emotion that rises from diagnosing threats in social engineering
breaches (Rogers, 1975). The more significant the threat, the more probable users would be
motivated to protect themselves from a social engineering breach (Milne et al., 2000).
Raising fear can result in a user taking additional protection actions (Rogers, 1975).
Consequently, if users feel that the negative consequences of a given security threat are
severe and likely to occur, they would be more motivated to perform suggested protection
behaviors.
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Users who emphasize controlling dangers of information security risk are more motivated
to mitigate the origin of the danger. Fear becomes a motivator based on positive coping
responses (Burns, Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2017). Burns et al. (2017) and Posey, Roberts,
and Lowry (2015) noted a positive relationship between fear and protection motivation. So,
hitherto background and the positive association between fear and protection motivation
brought about the following hypothesis:
H3: Fear is positively associated with protection motivation.
In this research study, perceived severity is social engineering breach's apparent impact.
According to the PMT, the higher the user's belief that social engineering breaches will cause
danger, the user is more motivated to adhere to information security compliance (Rogers,
1975). Past research demonstrated that perceived severity positively influences users' security
measures (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). Similarly, when a user faced a condition that
induces fear, the user may find that espousing the necessary measure will resolve the
situation (Boss et al., 2015). These results are reliable with other research studies that
demonstrated security concerns positively influence security attitudes, positively affecting
motivation to follow security measures (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Vance, Siponen, and
Pahnila (2012) noted a positive relationship between perceived severity and protection
motivation. Accordingly, the background up until now and the positive association between
perceived severity and protection motivation led to the following hypothesis:
H4: Perceived severity is positively associated with protection motivation.
In this research study, perceived vulnerability is the likelihood that an unwanted breach
will occur without following security measures. PMT states that the higher the perception of
a threat, the more the users will adapt to the desired behavior. Perceived vulnerability is a

14

users' belief in their chance of undergoing a threat. Posey et al. (2015) noted a positive
relationship between perceived vulnerability and protection motivation. Subsequently, the
context up until now and the positive association between perceived vulnerability and the
protection motivation directed to the following hypothesis:
H5: Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with protection motivation.
Users exhibit maladaptive responses when they believe that failing to adapt outweighs the
adaptation (Burns et al., 2017). Saving time is often considered a maladaptive reward in prior
information security compliance research (Vance et al., 2012). Youn (2009) substantiated
that the higher the maladaptive rewards lower the protection motivation. Both Burns et al.
(2017) and Boss et al. (2015) noted a negative relationship between maladaptive rewards and
protection motivation. So, hitherto background and the negative association between
perceived maladaptive rewards and protection motivation brought about the following
hypothesis:
H6: Maladaptive rewards are negatively associated with protection motivation.
In this research study, response efficacy signified users' confidence that specific behaviors
would allow them to prevent social engineering breaches. Users' perceptions of an
anticipated response's efficacy motivate them to exhibit desired behavior (Bandura, 1977).
Jayanti and Burns (1998) discovered outcome benefits to play a substantial part in the
motivation to perform the expected actions. Therefore, if users distinguish that a
recommended security measure is easy to exhibit but expects the results of using such
measure to be inefficient, they may not perform security measures (Compeau & Higgins,
1995).
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Kumar, Park, and Subramaniam (2008) found that response efficacy positively correlates
with executives' motivation to adopt security countermeasures. Johnston and Warkentin
(2010) noted a positive relationship between response efficacy and protection motivation.
Consequently, hitherto background and the positive association between response efficacy
and protection motivation brought about the following hypothesis:
H7: Response efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation.
In this research study, self-efficacy referred to users' belief that they can efficaciously
fulfill information security policies, preventing social engineering breaches. Bandura (1977)
initially perceived the notion of self-efficacy. Self-efficacy underscores users' judgment of
their capabilities to adhere to information security policies (Bandura, 1977). Likewise, selfefficacy was positively related to motivation for behaviors (Bandura, Adams, Hardy, &
Howells, 1980). Self-efficacy beliefs result in protection motivation towards information
security policies (Boss et al., 2015). Johnston and Warkentin (2010) noted that there is a
positive relationship between self-efficacy and protection motivation. Thus, background up
until now and the positive association between self-efficacy and protection motivation
directed the following hypothesis:
H8: Self-efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation.
PMT theorizes that as the response cost increases, the prospect of exhibiting the adaptive
coping response decreases. Prior IS research has found support in this matter. Kumar et al.
(2008) validated that the executive's security compliance motivation lowered when response
cost increased. In this research study, response cost included the inconvenience incurred in
complying with information security policies to prevent social engineering breaches.
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Furthermore, response cost is associated with apprehensions about how much it would cost to
perform the recommended protection response (Milne et al., 2000).
Response cost includes financial costs, the cognitive effort associated with a protective
countermeasure, the time required to implement the protection behaviors, expense,
inconvenience, difficulty, side effects, lost business, or opportunity cost (Burns et al., 2017).
The higher the response cost, the less motivated a user is to perform a behavior to protect
from social engineering breaches (Burns et al., 2017). Vance et al. (2012) noted a negative
relationship between response cost and protection motivation. So, hitherto context and the
negative association between response efficacy and protection motivation led to the
following hypothesis:
H9: Response cost is negatively associated with protection motivation.
Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis (2003) noted that intentions are good predictors for
the actual behavior, which, in the context of this research study, is users' information security
protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. The intention to follow
information security procedures leads to compliance with information security (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975). In addition, users' intention to exhibit the behavior of their interest determines
their actual behavior (Dinev & Hu, 2007). Intentions may capture the motivation that
stimulus a behavior, showing how hard users will perform a specific behavior (Ajzen, 1991).
Therefore, context up until now and the positive association between protection motivation
and protection behavior gave rise to the following hypothesis:
H10: Protection motivation is positively associated with protection behavior.
The SETA program strengthens adequate security guidelines and accentuates a breach's
potential significances to improve users' information security protection behavior (D'Arcy et
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al., 2009; Posey et al., 2015). In addition, the greater the SETA program, the more motivated
a user is to perform a behavior to protect from social engineering breaches (D'Arcy & Hovav,
2007; Posey et al., 2015; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Subsequently, hitherto background
and the positive association between SETA program and protection motivation resulted in the
following hypothesis:
H11: SETA program is positively associated with protection behavior.
Security policies cover rules, procedures, and guidelines for the appropriate and
inappropriate usage of information assets, resources, and systems, as well as penalties for
improper usage (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Kankanhalli et al., 2003). Furthermore, security policies
provide rules to the users regarding what to do and what not to do (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011;
Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2018; Straub & Welke, 1998). Due to its detailed guidelines, a
more advanced security policy results in higher user protection behavior (D'Arcy et al., 2009;
Lee et al., 2004). Therefore, the greater the security policies, the more protection behavior

users will exhibit toward social engineering breaches (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Herath & Rao
2009b). Accordingly, background up until now and the positive association between security
policies and protection motivation brought about the following hypothesis:
H12: Security policies are positively associated with protection behavior.
Table 1 demonstrated the constructs of the hypotheses of this research study.
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Table 1
Summary of Constructs used
Constructs

Definition

References

Perceived
severity

How serious the users believe that the social
engineering breach would be to themselves

Boss et al., 2015;
Floyd et al., 2000

Perceived
vulnerability

How personally susceptible a user feels to the
apparent social engineering threat

Boss et al., 2015;
Floyd et al., 2000

Fear

A negative emotion representing a response that
arises from recognizing social engineering danger

Boss et al., 2015;
Posey et al., 2015

Maladaptive
rewards

Purposefully avoiding a danger-control response
in response to social engineering fear appeal and
choosing a behavior that is not protective against
the social engineering danger raised in the fear
appeal

Boss et al., 2015;
Burns et al., 2017

Response
efficacy

The belief that the adaptive response will work
and taking the protection action will help protect
the self or others from social engineering breach

Boss et al., 2015;
Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010

Self-efficacy

The perceived ability of the individual to carry
out the adaptive response for social engineering
breach

Boss et al., 2015;
Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010

Response Cost

Any costs associated with taking the adaptive
coping response for social engineering breach

Boss et al., 2015;
Vance et al., 2012

SETA Program

SETA (Security Education Training Awareness)
program aims to reduce the organization's
security risk and increase the ability to prevent
social engineering breaches

Posey et al., 2015

Security Policies

Security policies provide comprehensive
direction to users regarding acceptable use of
organizational information assets and resources

D’Arcy & Hovav,
2007

Protection
Motivation

One's intentions to protect oneself from the social
engineering breach

Boss et al., 2015;
Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010;
Vance et al., 2012

Protection
Behavior

Purposefully choosing a danger-control response
in response to a social engineering threat and
choosing a behavior that protects against the
social engineering breach

Boss et al., 2015;
Dinev & Hu, 2007;
Venkatesh et al.,
2003
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Relevance and Significance
Technology on its own is inadequate in the arena of information security, and researchers
have started focusing on the human side of security (Goel, Williams, & Dincelli, 2017; Liang
& Xue, 2010; Wang, Li, & Rao, 2016). "Knowledge about user security behaviors is far from
complete" (Warkentin & Willison, 2009, p. 395). Understanding the factors that influence
users' information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches is vital
for any organization (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Kaushalya et al., 2018;
Krombholz et al., 2015).
Algarni et al. (2017) and Tetri and Vuorinen (2013) recognized the lack of research
involving social engineering and the need to understand crucial factors influencing users'
information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Therefore, a
complete and comprehensive overview was necessary to uncover factors influencing users'
protection motivation and behavior to prevent social engineering breaches (Bullée et al.,
2015).
Barriers and Issues
One of the barriers that might be possible for the survey questionnaire was that
participants might have been hesitant to provide undesirable responses in terms of
information security policies and standards. Information security expectations are prevalent
in most organizations, resulting in this research study's probable under-reporting of unwanted
behavior. Consequently, participants of this research study might have felt the possibility of
their employer finding their opinions about information security-related items. Therefore, to
mitigate this barrier, the survey questionnaire did not seek personal or employment details
that might have resulted in participant identification.
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This research's primary contribution is by incorporating the SETA program and security
policies into the PMT full nomology research model to perform an empirical assessment of
users' information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Social
engineering should be explored further in future research to provide additional insight into
this vital topic. There could be additional constructs that may provide other perceptions into
the information security behavior of individual users to prevent social engineering breaches.
Another barrier of this research study is the thought process for PMT itself. PMT is
grounded mainly on fear. It assumes that individuals retort to fear by protecting themselves.
There could be other factors in play that impacts users' behavior which PMT does not
consider. Future research should study users who fail in securely conducting themselves and
explore the reasons behind it.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
Assumptions included that the participants would be comfortable sharing their honest
opinion while answering the survey. Similarly, participants provided precise answers to the
survey questions, a crucial element regarding a sensitive topic like their organizations'
information security (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013).
Limitations
Limitations impact the research results, and researchers cannot control the limitations
(Creswell, 2005). The Hawthorne effect describes the pre-disposition in which participants
change their answers because they are observed (Olson, Verley, Santos, & Salas, 2004). The
participants may have been inﬂuenced by the fact that they could have been monitored for
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their organizational behavior and responded with the information closer to the desired
behaviors (Hagen & Albechtsen, 2009).
Delimitations
Delimitation refers to explaining the boundaries set and the study's scope (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2013). A delimitation of this research study was that all the samples belonged to
only one country, the United States of America (U.S.A.). The results of this research study
might have differed in the other countries.
Definition of Terms
The following section shows vital terms and their related definitions in the context of this
research study.
Information security – Protects information from a comprehensive array of threats to
safeguard business continuity, curtail business risk, and capitalize on business opportunities
and return investments (ISO/IEC, 2005).
Information system risk – Any financial loss or disruption of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA) of information systems caused by a malicious cyber-attack (Fielder,
Panaousis, Malacaria, Hankin, & Smeraldi, 2016; Rees, Deane, Rakes, & Baker, 2011).
Social engineering – A practice of using people skills and persuasion techniques to attain
unauthorized information is called social engineering (Jakobsson, 2016).
SETA program – A formal process to increase awareness and motivation through ongoing
training and education, remind users about the security guidelines to protect from the security
breach, and make users aware of the consequences of information misuse (D'Arcy et al.,
2009).
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Security policy – "a statement of the roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard
the information and technology resources of their organizations" (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, &
Benbasat, 2010, p. 526-527).
Protection motivation theory – A theory to elucidate how individuals change their attitudes
and actions, cope with the situation, and make decisions when facing danger (Rogers, 1975).
Threat appraisal – An element of PMT to evaluate the perceived threat level in a specific
situation (Floyd et al., 2000).
Coping appraisal – An element of PMT that evaluates several factors that are likely to
warrant an individual to engage in a suggested preventive response (Floyd et al., 2000).
Perceived severity – A degree to which a user perceives that adverse results, including
physical and psychological damage caused by a social engineering breach, will be severe
(Liang & Xue, 2010).
Perceived vulnerability – A perception of the probability of experiencing adverse results
from a social engineering breach (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008).
Maladaptive rewards – An expected benefit to be gained for not exhibiting protection
behavior of complying with information security measures to prevent social engineering
breaches (Boss et al., 2015).
Response efficacy – A user's belief that an adaptive response (a recommended behavior) will
help mitigate social engineering breaches (Workman et al., 2008; Yoon, Hwang, & Kim,
2012).
Self-efficacy – User's beliefs in their ability to perform adaptive response against a social
engineering breach (Yoon et al., 2012).
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Response costs – Users' perceived downsides for indulging in protection behavior (Posey et
al., 2015).
Fear – A user's negative emotional response to danger (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston et al.,
2015).
Protection motivation – An intention to execute protection behaviors against security
breaches (Floyd et al., 2000).
Protection behavior – An actual execution of protective behaviors against security breaches
(Floyd et al., 2000).
PLS-SEM – A structural equation modeling technique develops exploratory research
theories to comprehend multifaceted cause-effect relationship models with latent variables
(Hair, Risher, Sarstedt, & Ringle, 2019).

List of Acronyms
The following section comprises acronyms utilized throughout this research study.
IT – Information Technology
SE – Social Engineering
CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
SETA – Security Education Training Awareness
PMT – Protection Motivation Theory
PS – Perceived Severity
PV – Perceived Vulnerability
FE – Fear
MR – Maladaptive Rewards
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RE – Response Efficacy
SE – Self-efficacy
RC – Response Cost
ST – SETA Program
SP – Security Policies
PM – Protection Motivation
PB – Protection Behavior
PLS-SEM – Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling
IRB – Institutional Review Board
Summary
Chapter one of this research study included background, problem statement, dissertation
goal, research model, research question, and hypotheses. It contained relevance and
significance, barriers and issues, assumptions, limitations, delimitations, the definition of
terms, and a list of acronyms. Chapter one set the tone of this research study by stating the
main problem, framework, and significance. Chapter two of this research study contains a
literature review to help as the groundwork and reasoning for the research problem, research
questions, hypotheses, and methodology. It delivers information about the current state of
research on the selected topic. Likewise, it synthesizes prior research, integrates the
literature's critical details, and detects potential gaps and disagreements.
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Chapter 2

Review of the Literature
Introduction
This chapter contains an analysis of the literature regarding the research question raised
by this research study (Paré, Trudel, Jaana, & Kitsiou, 2015). In addition, it synthesizes
research about information security and social engineering, and it commences with a brief
overview of information security, social engineering, the SETA program, and security
policies. A subsequent discussion about protection motivation theory and its constructs
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear, maladaptive rewards, response efficacy,
self-efficacy, response cost, protection motivation, and protection behavior follows. Finally,
this chapter includes the gaps in PMT and information systems literature.
Information Security
Warkentin and Willison (2009) stated that the most significant threats are insider threats
from organizational users who are 'trusted agents.' Despite the technology solutions,
understanding why users fall for information security breaches and expose personally
identifiable information (PII) needed much research attention (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Liang &
Xue, 2010; Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, an emerging research stream on the human
standpoint of information security emphasized user protection behaviors and the factors that
motivate users to exhibit the protection behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Goel et al., 2017;
Liang & Xue, 2010).
Irrespective of the right technology implemented to protect organizational information
assets, users frequently exhibited undesirable security behaviors like mishandling passwords,
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clicking on dangerous links, and accessing unprotected networks (Das & Khan, 2016; Jensen,
Dinger, Wright, & Thatcher, 2017; Menard, Bott, & Crossler, 2017). In other words, social
engineering breaches are often not the result of technology failure, but because users ignore
or override security measures (Bravo-Lillo, Cranor, Downs, & Komanduri, 2011; Menard et
al., 2017). The reasons for this problem were uncertain and necessitated additional research.
Therefore, the research study described in this thesis investigated why users do not perform
protection behaviors against social engineering breaches.

Social Engineering
Social engineering breaches remained an ongoing risk that allows hackers to evade
security measures and pose a significant risk (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Goel
et al., 2017). For example, Heartfield and Loukas (2015) researched semantic attacks, one of
the many social engineering attacks. Junger, Montoya, and Overink (2017) measured
disclosure by asking sensitive information subjecting to increase social engineering risk.
Furthermore, Algarni et al. (2017) explored Facebook users' susceptibility to social
engineering victimization.
Moreover, Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009) found insufficient existing information
security and privacy protection techniques. Mouton, Leenen, and Venter (2016) combined
social engineering attack templates with real-world examples. In addition, Bullée et al.
(2015) found that increasing awareness about the countermeasures associated with social
engineering demonstrated a substantial helpful effect on neutralizing the attack.
Organizations and institutions suffer from social engineering attacks (Abraham &
Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009). As
technology increases in sophistication, deceitful attackers target users rather than users'
technology (Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016; Xue, Liang, & Wu, 2011). The principal
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danger to organizational security is not a technical glitch or inefficient system; it is a user
(Algarni et al., 2017; Anderson & Agarwal, 2010, 2011). In this unprecedented era of online
invention, users may spontaneously give away sensitive information without understanding
security repercussions (D'Arcy & Lowry, 2019; Goel & Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Krombholz
et al., 2015).
Many users overlook the warnings generated by the technology and tools to prevent social
engineering breaches for various motives (Goel et al., 2017; Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012; Luga,

Nurse, & Erola, 2016). As a result, social engineering traps gullible users intentionally into
conveying their confidential data, thus providing open access to an organization's
fundamental assets, circumventing all the layers of organizational policies and systems
(Brody et al., 2012; Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 2012). Furthermore, some social engineering is
involved in most information security attacks (Bullée et al., 2015; Tu, Turel, Yuan, &
Archer, 2015).
Social engineering has become an ever-increasing threat impacting multinational
organizations, governments, and individuals (Williams, Hinds, & Joinson, 2018). Social
engineering is the most popular technique among hackers because it can break even the
utmost protected systems (Krombholz et al., 2015). Also, the users themselves are the
weakest part of the information security system, and it is more natural to exploit users'
weaknesses than exploit technology loopholes (Liang, Xue, Pinsonneault, & Wu, 2019).
Moreover, social engineers have fully automated attacks and orchestrated them on a colossal
scale (Krombholz et al., 2015).
Social engineers carry attacks over various channels, including email, telephone, websites,
cloud, and social networks, and can originate either by humans or technology (Krombholz et
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al., 2015). There are numerous types of social engineering outbreaks like phishing, spear
phishing, dumpster diving, shoulder surﬁng, reverse social engineering, waterhole attacks,
advanced persistent threat, and baiting (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; Krombholz et al., 2015).
Phishing is a practice of trying to gather confidential information using deceptive
mechanisms like e-mails, phones, text messages, and websites (Conteh & Schmick, 2016;
Dodge, Carver, & Ferguson, 2007). In addition, spear phishing is a practice of targeting a
specific individual, organization, or business to gather confidential information using
deceptive mechanisms like e-mails, phones, text messages, and websites (Chaudhry,
Chaudhry, & Rittenhouse, 2016). The difference between phishing and spear-phishing is that
the phishing campaigns do not target victims individually, unlike spear phishing (Chaudhry
et al., 2016). Moreover, dumpster diving retrieves information from the documents from
rubbish (Krombholz et al., 2015; Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013).
Shoulder surﬁng is a practice of gaining information by making secret, direct observations
like watching a user's keystrokes while using a computer (Tetri & Vuorinen, 2013). On the
other hand, reverse social engineering is a practice where an attacker gains the victim's trust
by offering help (Krombholz et al., 2015). A waterhole attack is a practice where an attacker
infects the websites often visited by the target victims at the waterhole (Fan, Lwakatare, &
Rong 2017). An advanced persistent threat is a practice where an attacker uses continuous
and concealed methods to gain access to information, steal data, or surveil systems of the
victim's organization and remain inside for a long time (Fan et al., 2017).
Baiting is a practice where an attacker exploits the victims' greediness and inquisitiveness
by luring them into a trap of something like a gift kept somewhere and can be received by the
victims (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; Fan et al., 2017). Known as voice phishing or phone
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elicitation, vishing is a practice where an attacker uses social engineering to assess
vulnerabilities and call victims to lure them into conceding confidential information (Fan et
al., 2017). Pretexting is a practice where an attacker uses a fabricated scenario and a false
motive to obtain confidential data using methods like namedropping, impersonation, and
untruthful identity (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; Fan et al., 2017).
Tailgating, also known as piggybacking, is a practice where an attacker seeks access to
the restricted area by following the victim's authorized access (Conteh & Schmick, 2016; Fan
et al., 2017). Quid pro quo is a practice where an attacker presents a technical service in
exchange for information; for example, the attacker mimics a vendor representative and
offers to help a victim who needs technical assistance (Conteh & Schmick, 2016).
SETA Program
Information security leaders implement information security measures, including security
education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs to improve the security protection
behavior of users (Johnston et al., 2015). Thus, SETA programs emphasize raising users'
awareness of their responsibilities related to organizational information assets and resources,
the penalties of misusing them, and providing training and education to build these
capabilities (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Johnston et al., 2015). Efficacious SETA programs
should result in augmented mindfulness of protection behaviors by making users recognize
security risks concerning their interactions with information resources and mitigate them by
refining their acts (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston et al., 2015).
Users who had better abilities to detect the social engineering breach are the ones who did
better in refusing to provide access to the organizational information assets (Parsons,
McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2015; Wright & Marett, 2010). The deep-
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knowledgeable users about social engineering emails and the relevant repercussions did
better in responding to the emails than ill-knowledgeable (Jansson & von Solms, 2013;
Parsons et al., 2015; Stajano & Wilson, 2011). Accordingly, the goal of the SETA program is
to inspire users to focus increasingly on a proactive approach instead of a reactive approach
(Straub & Welke, 1998; Vance et al., 2012).
Security Policies
Security policies are statements of organizational goals, controls, procedures, rules, and
users' responsibilities to prevent social engineering breaches (Lee & Lee, 2002). The details
and complexity of security policies differ from industry to industry (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007).
Specifically, the financial services industry may have more stringent security policies than
hospitality (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007).
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)
PMT, developed in 1975 by Rogers, utilizes the cognitive process that users undergo when
they experience danger and respond accordingly (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975).
Furthermore, it was initially developed based on the expectancy-value theory to
comprehensively understand the impact of fear appeals on attitude (Maddux & Rogers, 1983;
Rogers, 1975). Moreover, PMT underwent two meta-analyses (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et
al., 2000). PMT originated in the health science and psychology field, primarily known for
motivating people to practice healthy behavior (Posey et al., 2015). PMT is now widely
recognized as a framework to study protection motivation against any threat (Posey et al.,
2015).
PMT provides an efficient theoretical foundation for analyzing how users determine what
kind of security behaviors to exhibit. At the base of PMT, there are two leading independent
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appraisal processes transpiring as an effect of a fear appeal: threat appraisal and coping
appraisal (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). The two kinds of coping appraisal are adaptive coping
(to protect) and maladaptive coping (not to protect) (Floyd et al., 2000). PMT theorizes that
threat appraisal determines factors for a user to adopt a specified coping response (Floyd et
al., 2000). Posey et al. (2015) summarized threat appraisal and coping appraisal succinctly:
Threat appraisal is the process by which insiders analyze (1) their perceived
vulnerability, (2) their perceived severity, and (3) potential intrinsic or extrinsic
rewards for engaging in maladaptive responses. Coping appraisal is the process by
which insiders evaluate (1) the efficacy of the potential adaptive responses to a threat
or response efficacy; (2) their ability to successfully carry out the recommended
responses, or self-efficacy; and (3) the perceived response costs associated with their
engagement in the adaptive coping strategy (p. 6-7).
The threat appraisal procedure encompasses the users' perception determination about
vulnerability to an information security threat (perceived vulnerability), the brutality of the
threat (perceived severity), the terror of the threat (fear) (Boss et al., 2015), as well as any
intrinsic or extrinsic inspiration for exhibiting an unwanted behavior (maladaptive rewards)
(Vance et al., 2012). The coping appraisal procedure encompasses the users determining
whether protection action is efficient at protecting from the threat (response efficacy),
whether they are capable of executing the protection action (self-efficacy) and if it justifies
the perceived cost of the action (response cost) (Floyd et al., 2000). Furthermore, response
efficacy is the user's belief that complying with the organization's information security
measures will prevent the breach (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Moreover, self-efficacy is the
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user's confidence to adhere to the organization's information security measures (Bandura,
1977).
Perceived Severity
Perceived severity is a users' valuation of the severity of the significances caused by a
social engineering breach (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Liang and Xue (2010) and Mohamed and
Ahmad (2012) appeared to have found a positive relationship between perceived severity and
protection behavior. Prior literature, such as Hanus and Wu (2016) and Youn (2005), did not
associate perceived severity and protection behavior. Zahedi, Abbasi, and Chen (2015) found
perceived severity as a foremost forecaster for protection motivation. In contrast, LaRose and
Eastin (2004) and Lee et al. (2008) did not find a significant relationship between perceived
severity and protection motivation.
Perceived Vulnerability
If users perceive they are susceptible to a social engineering breach, they are more likely
to follow information security measures (Workman et al., 2008). Liang and Xue (2010),
Mohamed and Ahmad (2012), as well as Ng et al. (2009) appeared to have found a weak
positive relationship between perceived vulnerability and protection behavior. Additionally,
prior literature such as Hanus and Wu (2016) and Youn (2005) did not find any positive
relation between perceived vulnerability and protection behavior.
Fear
Information security scholars are seemingly attuned to utilize fear which motivates users
to abide by suggested security protection behaviors (Herath & Rao, 2009a; Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010). Mwagwabi, McGill, and Dixon (2018) studied fear regarding guideline
usage for secure password creation. In conjunction with perceived severity and perceived
vulnerability, fear has a unique and essential role in PMT (Boss et al., 2015). In addition, fear is
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frequently a user's emotional response to a threat (Rosenstock, 1974; Witte, 1994). Fear may
comprise anxiety, uneasiness, shock, provocation, worry, or distress (Boss et al., 2015;
Rosenstock, 1966). "Fear appeals are a necessary component of a holistic security

management program because threats to information assets are prevalent and must be warned
against" (Johnston et al., 2015, p. 117).
Maladaptive Rewards
If users perceive that the reward for not exhibiting protection motivation is higher than
exhibiting it, they will be less likely to exhibit it (Vance et al., 2012). Rewards increase the
likelihood of choosing the maladaptive behavior (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Floyd et al.,
2000). Maladaptive rewards are paybacks from following protection measures and, therefore, can
be perceived in the form of time-saving, cost-saving, efficiency, pleasure, or even damage (Boss

et al., 2015; Floyd et al., 2000; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).
Response Efficacy
Response efficacy is the degree to which a user believes that a specific action prevents a
social engineering breach (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Jayanti & Burns, 1998; Venkatesh et
al., 2003). If a user believes that a specific task will secure organizational information assets,
the user will be more motivated to comply (Meso, Ding, & Xu, 2013). Response efficacy
measures the user's belief in the efficacy of security measures in addition to self-efficacy
(Johnston et al., 2015). The perceived efficiency of security measures positively inclined the
security measure to not download unknown files and not click on unknown links to prevent
social engineering breaches (Lai et al., 2012).
Response efficacy appeared to have found positively associated with authentication
service (Yang et al., 2017), acceptance of spyware protection (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010),
and an acceptance of security policy (Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009). Prior literature
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such as Gurung, Luo, and Liao (2009), Hanus and Wu (2016), Hu and Dinev (2005), Liang
and Xue (2010), as well as Yoon et al. (2012), found a positive relation between response
efficacy and protection behavior. Nonetheless, Mohamed and Ahmad (2012) appeared to
have found no positive connection between response efficacy and protection behavior.
Self-efficacy
Self-efficacy of noticing information security breaches may reduce one's chance of being
breached (Wang et al., 2016). PMT introduced self-efficacy by adopting the social cognitive
theory of Bandura (1977). Furthermore, highly self-efficacious users will be more likely to
exhibit protection behavior by engaging in protection actions and avoiding high-risk
activities such as sharing passwords and clicking on unknown links (Hu & Dinev, 2005;
Milne, Labrecque, & Cromer, 2009). Self-efficacy involved former research investigating
counterfeit website detectors (Zahedi et al., 2015) and online safety protection behaviors (Lee
et al., 2008). Prior literature, such as Hanus and Wu (2016) and Yoon et al. (2012), found a
positive relationship between self-efficacy and protection behavior. On the other hand, Tsai,
Jiang, Alhabash, LaRose, Rifon, and Cotton (2016) found a negative relation between selfefficacy and protection motivation.
Response Cost
Response cost can be any delay, obstacle, side effect, or disadvantage that users believe
they will incur if they exhibit protection behavior (Posey et al., 2015). The adoption of
protection behavior may involve some reluctance for the users to espouse. For instance, if a
user observes a high response cost for complying with the security measure, the probability
of non-compliance is also high (Meso et al., 2013). Similarly, response costs decrease the
likelihood of choosing adaptive behavior (Floyd et al., 2000).
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Researchers have found that the perceived response cost discourages users from
exhibiting protection behavior (Arachchilage & Love, 2013; Boss et al., 2015; Taneja,
Vitrano, & Gengo, 2014; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Prior literature, such as Liang and Xue
(2010), and Yoon et al. (2012), found a negative relation between response cost and
protection behavior. Mohamed and Ahmad (2012) and Ng et al. (2009) appeared to have
found no link between response cost and protection behavior.
Protection Motivation
Protection motivation intends to perform protection behaviors against a social engineering
threat (Lee, Lim, Kim, Zo, & Ciganek, 2013; Sommestad et al., 2015). Technical and socialorganizational aspects are central to the success of information security (Bulgurcu et al.,
2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007). Subsequently, protection motivation for information security
breaches has emerged as a crucial socio-technical factor (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Liang & Xue,
2010; Wang et al., 2016). The prior research for protection motivation included the intention
not to disclose personal information (Beldad, van der Geest, de Jong, & Steehouder, 2012)
and intention to comply with IT security policies (Crossler, Long, Loraas, & Trinkle, 2014).
Protection Behavior
Protection behavior is the actual performance of protection actions against social
engineering threats (Arachchilage & Love, 2014). Specifically, prior research encompassed
analysis of protection behavior concerning phishing, a type of social engineering (Arachchilage

& Love, 2013, 2014). Understanding users' protection behavior to prevent social engineering
breaches is vital for organizations (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Bullée et al., 2015; Chai et al.,
2009). Similarly, Liang and Xue (2010) stated that research about users' information security
behaviors needs much work. As per Liang and Xue (2010), "Although a few studies have
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examined individual users' security behavior, the findings are largely inconsistent and
sometimes contradictory" (p. 404).
Utilization PMT and Information Systems Literature
PMT postulates that when users experience a threat, they undergo cognitive threat
appraisal and coping appraisal processes. A user accesses threat and corresponding coping
mechanisms and determines to perform adaptive or maladaptive behaviors. These adaptive
behaviors intend to protect the user against danger, while maladaptive responses prevent the
desired behavior.
PMT is an exceedingly pertinent theory in information security research due to the
tangible threat-response pairs commonly found in information security. PMT is a wellresearched theory to explore privacy concerns over social network sites (Alashoor et al.,
2017; Mohamed & Ahmad, 2012), intention for antispyware software usage (Gurung et al.,
2009), and online protection actions (Chen & Zahedi, 2016).
PMT has been used to research online shopping protection behavior (Milne et al., 2009),
online protection behavior (Lee et al., 2008), online unsafety behavior (Chou & Chou, 2016),
and secure email behavior (Ng et al., 2009). Similarly, PMT has been used to discover what
motivates users to comply with security measures like data backup (Lee & Kozar, 2005;
Menard, Gatlin, & Warkentin, 2014).
PMT is well-utilized to research protection behavior of securing desktops (Hanus & Wu,
2016), online safety behaviors (Tsai et al., 2016), and adoption of security behaviors
(Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash, & Cotton, 2015). For example, Lee and Larsen (2009)
used PMT to discover what motivates users to comply with security measures like antimalware software and explored social influence. Consistently, PMT has been used to
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investigate compliance with information security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Ifinedo,
2012; Johnston et al., 2015; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2010) and unified security
practices (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014).
Crossler et al. (2013) explored PMT and behavioral InfoSec areas, including insider
deviant behavior versus insider misbehavior, security compliance, and data collection and
measurement. Similarly, Workman et al. (2008) examined a research model to determine
why users would not exhibit protection behavior and why they would choose not to protect
themselves, even if they believed in the self's ability to defend.
PMT has been used to explore malware avoidance behavior (Dang-Pham &
Pittayachawan, 2015), adoption of antivirus software, and strong passwords (Meso et al.,
2013; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), and coping behaviors to fight identity theft (Lai et al.,
2012). Additionally, PMT is well-served to discover the intention to practice safe computing
at home (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010) and intentions and behaviors to use antispyware
(Liang & Xue, 2010).
PMT has been used to explore protection behavior against online harassment (Lwin, Li, &
Ang, 2012) and online safety behaviors (Yoon et al., 2012). For example, Johnston and
Warkentin (2010) utilized PMT by studying the threat-response pair where users experienced
the spyware threats and, at the same time, were given an antispyware mechanism to protect
themselves. Thus, PMT has been utilized and verified as the leading theory in many studies
related to information security in organizations (Boss et al., 2015; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Liang
& Xue, 2010; Moody et al., 2018; Workman et al., 2008).
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Gaps in PMT and Information Systems Literature
Information security research routinely dropped proven PMT constructs instead of
utilizing the PMT full nomology (Boss et al., 2015). Anderson and Agarwal (2010), Chou
and Chou (2016), Herath and Rao (2009a), Johnston and Warkentin (2010), as well as,
Kumar et al. (2008) focused on the adaptive coping response of PMT instead of including a
maladaptive coping portion of PMT in their research. Adaptive behavior is the behavior that
users exhibit to avert the threat from revealing itself (Chen & Zahedi, 2016). On the contrary,
maladaptive coping is the users' choice not to comply with a security measure to protect from
the security breach (Boss et al., 2015).
The review of the literature exposed that most of the information systems research
involving PMT utilized only part of PMT instead of using the full model (Crossler &
Bélanger, 2014; Ifinedo, 2012; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010; Workman
et al., 2008). PMT is a cognitive process with fear appeal as the central factor determining
how it impacts attitude and behavior (Milne et al., 2000; Rogers, 1975). Even though the
relationship between fear and protection motivation seems so natural and fear is one of the
most significant constructs of PMT, extant information security research has dropped fear
construct from the PMT research model most of the time (Floyd et al. 2000; Rogers 1975).
Fear is the most significant factor in the adaptive coping process of PMT. Nonetheless, much
information systems research involving PMT did not include fear (Chou & Chou, 2016;
Hanus & Wu, 2016; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Tsai et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017).
Again and again, information systems research involving PMT did not include response
cost (Boehmer et al., 2015; Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Johnston et al., 2015; Mohamed &
Ahmad, 2012). In many instances, information systems research involving PMT did not
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include perceived severity (Alashoor et al., 2017). Some information systems research
involving PMT did not contain perceived vulnerability (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Some
information systems research involving PMT did not include response efficacy (Youn, 2005).
On top of that, some information systems research involving PMT did not comprise selfefficacy (Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Most of the extant research explored protection
motivation and did not include behavior (Posey et al., 2015).
This literature overview highlighted predominantly significant existing gaps. It
demonstrated that the effects of PMT on protection motivation and behavior to prevent social
engineering breaches are still not well recognized or dependable in literature. Though PMT is
well-accepted to discover new information security models (Moody et al., 2018), PMT's full
research model has not been accurately used to study users' behavior to prevent social
engineering breaches.
There was a lack of literature utilizing PMT combined with the SETA program and
security policies to explore factors affecting users' information security protection behavior
to prevent social engineering breaches. This research study was exploratory. Based on the
gaps in existing literature, this research study discovered factors affecting users' information
security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches using full PMT
nomology.
Summary
The multidisciplinary nature of the problem in this research study required a thorough
literature review. Despite the research steered in social engineering, other studies have failed
to solve the problem, and social engineering seems to be still a problem. An assessment of
numerous facets of PMT resulted in delivering the groundwork for this research study. PMT
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has been utilized in the information security field to study protection motivation and
protection behaviors.
Previous research did not use the combination of the PMT full nomology, the SETA
program, and security policies to explain social engineering protection behavior. An in-depth
literature review resulted in the necessary information for an empirical assessment of users'
information security protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches leveraging
protection motivation theory, the SETA program, and security policies. Chapter two
concluded the literature review.
The next chapter of this research study contains information about methodology. It
includes an overview of the research design to answer the research questions and test the
hypotheses. It encompasses instrument development and validation, and measurement items
for the constructs. Furthermore, it contains instrument reliability and validity, internal
consistency reliability, construct validity, content validity, convergent validity, and
discriminant validity. It comprises details of the proposed sample, sample population, and
anticipated response rate. It presents a plan for data analysis, formats for demonstrating
results, and resource requirements.
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Chapter 3

Methodology
Introduction
This research study explored the role threat appraisal (perceived severity, perceived
vulnerability, fear, and maladaptive rewards), coping appraisal (response efficacy, selfefficacy, and response costs), SETA program, and security policies have with the users'
information security protection motivation and protection behavior to prevent social
engineering breaches. Data Science is an overarching term for methodologies to gather
insights from data. Quantitative analysis is the procedure of collecting and analyzing
quantifiable and provable data to gain intuition. This research study is quantitative and
utilized formerly established survey instruments for both the dependent and independent
variables. Web survey administration provided statistical analysis input. A seven-point Likert
scale measured constructs. Participant’s demographics and background information were
collected, followed by a validity and reliability assessment of the response data.
The Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling, known as PLS-SEM, is used to
model and estimate the cause-effects relationship model. PLS-SEM is suitable for
exploratory research by identifying the variance in the dependent variables when verifying
proposed theoretical models (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2017). Data results assisted in
hypotheses validation. The data results are summarized, followed by the conclusion.
Research Design Overview
The research method was quantitative research comprised of data collection, analysis,
interpretation, and presentation of the research study (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The
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research method included web-based survey research to test the research model empirically.
The research study utilized the positivism research philosophy to derive measurable
observations that result in statistical evaluations, ensuring that research results are observable
and quantifiable.
The research study was a cross-sectional type where the study measured a cross-section
of a given population at one precise instant in time. The unit of analysis was the primary
entity that the intended research study was planning to analyze. Furthermore, the unit of
analysis of this research study was individual users, as it was the most appropriate choice
based on the research plan of the study. The research study tested all the items in the context
of users’ information security protection behavior towards social engineering breaches.
Research Methodology
Human Ethical Attention
Prior approval by the Nova Southeastern University institutional review board (IRB) was
a prerequisite to conducting this research study. So, the survey of this research study went
through an IRB process. The research study was not hostile, devious, daunting, or traumatic
to the participants and guaranteed participants that their identity would be kept completely
anonymous, and their responses will be strictly utilized only for this research study (Gall,
Borg, & Gall, 1996).
Delphi Method Study
A panel of three SMEs in the information security area reviewed the web-based survey
questionnaire and measurement items. SMEs provided advice to attain consensus in solving
the problem, evaluate the course of action, and assess the web-based survey questionnaire.
The enhanced survey questionnaire encompassed SMEs’ expert advice.
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Data Collection
Four hundred potential participants received a data collection survey. The web-based
survey data presented a high-level overview of this research study, researcher contact
information, and an estimated survey completion time frame. It showed details on ensuring
confidentiality and anonymity of participants and assurance about using the data strictly for
this research study. The participants received the urge to provide the most accurate and
honest answers to the questions, and participants received thanks at the end of the survey.
Instrument Development and Validation
Construct operationalization is the method of ensuring that variables are measured as
impeccably as possible. This research study utilized an interval scale because it provides
measurements where the difference between the values of two variables is expressive. One of
the most successfully used interval scale measurements in social science is the Likert scale.
The range of the seven-point Likert scale was (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 =
somewhat disagree; 4 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = somewhat agree; 6 = agree; 7 =
strongly agree).
Each of the measurement items incorporated in this research study was reflective (Hair et
al., 2017). This research study used the pre-validated measurement items verified in the
former research. One of the survey items for the variable, protection behavior, was selfdeveloped; the rest of the survey items for all the dependent and independent variables were
previously developed and validated in the prior literature (Churchill, 1979; Straub, 1989).
Appendix A showed a measurement item summary stating the complete list of all
measurement items. Appendix B showed an overview of reliability evidence stating the
complete list of reliability evidence. The purpose of using existing measurement items was to
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understand the phenomenon in a new context of social engineering (Niederman & March,
2015). Performing research on proven measurement items further validated, provided
additional insight on the existing instrument scales, and supported future research about
social engineering.
Instrument Reliability and Validity
Instrument reliability safeguards that an instrument is reliable and measures dependably.
Instrument validity defenses that reliable results are also valid. Instrument validity and
reliability both are necessary. It is not possible to achieve instrument validity without
achieving instrument reliability. Instrument reliability is a prerequisite for instrument
validity. The subsequent steps ensured instrument reliability and validity in this research
study.
Internal Consistency Reliability
Cronbach's alpha calculation safeguarded the internal consistency reliability (Hair, Black,
Babin, & Anderson, 2010). All the factors in this research study had Cronbach’s alpha values
well above 0.7 to ensure internal consistency reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
Construct Validity and Content Validity
Factor analysis performed using SmartPLS software tested construct validity. Delphi
study safeguarded the construct validity, content validity and attained agreement on survey
instrument measurement items over two rounds before finalization. Three subject-matter
experts (SMEs) participated in the Delphi study.
Convergent Validity
Factor analysis safeguarded the convergent validity of the instrument (Fornell & Larcker,
1981). The average variance extracted (AVE) is the average variance in indicator variables
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that the corresponding construct successfully clarifies. AVE is a degree of the discrepancy
amount taken by a construct due to variance owing to measurement error. Hair et al. (2010)
asserted that all constructs' AVE value should be more than the 0.5 minimum threshold.
Discriminant Validity
The discriminant validity ensured the most solid relationships between a reflective
construct and its indicators (Hair et al., 2010). This research study safeguarded the
instrument's discriminant validity by successfully fulfilling the cross-loading method (Chin,
1998).
Sample
Sampling Type
The non-probability sampling approach is the approach that relies on the subjective
judgment of the researcher. The purposive sampling approach is one of the types of nonprobability sampling approach. The research study's purposive sampling (also called
judgment, subjective, or selective sampling) approach decisively pursued specific group
members. Information technology (IT) users who are not IT professionals may have different
views on social engineering breaches than IT professionals. The target group for this research
study did not restrict to just IT professionals; any users who use information technology were
eligible for the survey. The target group in this research study was IT users.
Sampling Recruitment
The research study used emails to recruit participants. Response time was rapid, and the
cost per participant was lesser without compromising the quality than other enrollment
approaches (Steelman, Hammer, & Limayem, 2014). Participants were not compensated or
incentivized to participate in the survey.
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Sampling Size
Cohen's (1992) statistical power analysis is one of the most prevalent methods in
determining sampling size and an essential factor in designing experiments and testing results
(Cappelleri, Darlington, & Trochim, 1994; Thomas & Juanes, 1996). Cohen's (1992)
statistical power analysis utilizes the relationships among the five factors: sampling size,
significance level, effect size, desired power, and estimated variance. Each of the five factors
is a function of the other four for any statistical model (Cohen, 1992).
According to Cohen's (1992) statistical power analysis, any given statistical test can
calculate sampling size by supplying values for the other four factors: significance level,
effect size, desired power, and estimated variance. For this research study, the appropriate
sampling size was at least one hundred and sixteen based on Cohen's (1992) statistical power
analysis table at a statistical power of 80%, a medium effect size of .30, and a significance
level of 0.05.
The plan to attain a large enough sampling size subsequently determined the total number
of target participants (Cohen, 1988; Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). The goal was to solicit a
response from at least one hundred and sixteen participants. With a 29% estimated
completion rate, a web-based survey targeted four hundred participants. Only U.S.A.
residents received the survey.
Descriptive Statistics
The web-based survey captured participants’ demographics and background information,
including gender, age, education, and social engineering breach exposure (Steelman et al.,
2014). Table 2 showed the participants’ demographic and background information questions
and corresponding scales.
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Table 2
Participants Demographics and Background Questions
Item

Questions

Scale

Options

Gender

What is your
gender?

3-point category
scale

1 = Male; 2 = Female, 3 = Other

Age

What is your age
range?

6-point Likert
scale

1 = 18–24; 2 = 25–34; 3 = 35–44; 4 =
45–54; 5 = 55–64; 6 = Over 65 Years

Education

What is your
highest education
achieved?

7-point Likert
scale

1 = Some School, No Degree; 2 = High
School Graduate; 3 = Some College, No
Degree; 4 = Associate’s Degree; 5 =
Bachelor’s Degree; 6 = Master’s
Degree; 7 = Doctoral Degree

Social
Engineering
Breach
Exposure

What is your
exposure to social
engineering
breaches?

3-point category
scale

1 = None, 2 = Some, 3 = Extensive

Data Analysis
Pre-analysis Screening
Reliability and validity examinations comprised preliminary statistical analysis. The
reliability check encompassed Cronbach’s alpha, while the validity verification involved
convergent and discriminant validity (Cronbach, 1951). There were no questions where all
the answers were identical. The research study checked the Mahalanobis distance in the pretesting phase (Mahalanobis, 1936). The Mahalanobis distance is equal to the distance
between two points in the multivariate arena. The Mahalanobis distance measures distance
relative to the central point. The benefit of using Mahalanobis distance was to recognize and
remove multivariate outliers in the pre-testing phase.
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Common Method Bias
Common method bias (CMB, also known as common method variance, CMV) are the
variations created by the measuring method rather than constructs the measures are supposed
to measure (Schaller, Patil, & Malhotra, 2014). The questions on the web-based survey were
unambiguous, and the web-based survey requested the participants to answer the questions
with honesty and sincerity to reduce common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012).
Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling
The data was analyzed and interpreted using Structural Equation Modeling, considering
the research question and PMT (Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub, 2011). PLS-SEM is a Structural
Equation Modeling (SEM), a vigorous technique that permits assessing intricate cause-effect
relationship models involving latent variables (Hair et al., 2019). The partial Least Squares
Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) method verified the research model.
The PLS-SEM comprises two sub-models. The two sub-models are measurement and
structural models. It allows adequate valuation of the measurement and structural models
(Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). The measurement model signifies the relationships between the
observed data and the latent variables and links the measurable indicators to the unobservable
latent variables (Chin, 1998). The structural model implies the relationships between latent
variables while the path coefficients verify the relationships between independent and
dependent variables. PLS-SEM analysis in this research study utilized SmartPLS, version
3.0, to simultaneously evaluate measurement and structural models (Hair et al., 2011).
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Formats for Presenting Results
The table format presented the construct reliability and validity summary and the
hypotheses test summary. Furthermore, the figure format displayed the research model. The
Appendices showed the survey questionnaire and IRB approval.
Resource Requirements
This research study utilized the Delphi method to fetch advice from an expert panel of
information security professionals. Feedback from the expert panel aided in measurement
item improvements. The data sample originated from a pool of users working in the U.S.A.
Each step of the research study required the use of software, hardware, and technology.
Moreover, the web-based tool Google® Forms abetted in survey instrument development and
participants’ data collection.
Microsoft® Excel assisted in participant’s data summarization and synthesis.
Furthermore, IBM® SPSS® Statistics supported descriptive statistics, ANOVA, and the
creation of graphs. Scholarly books reference provided critical contributions to this research
study. Journals and peer-reviewed articles written by experts provided a viewpoint of
significant historical research conducted. Alvin Sherman Library of Nova Southeastern
University provided access to journals and peer-reviewed articles.
Summary
This chapter described the rationale for selecting a specific methodology to gather,
process, and summarized information to understand the problem. It described plans for
conducting the research methods, data collection, and data analysis. The web survey,
prepared using pre-validated items from the broader PMT literature, conducted the data
collection in this research study. This chapter stated the research study participants,
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procedures, and instruments. In addition, it specified that data were collected and analyzed
using a reliable and recognized method in the field of this research study. It included details
about IRB approval to guard human participants' privileges and well-being in this research
study. It offered adequate material to permit other researchers to repeat this research study. It
showed how the overall methodology provided answers to the original research question.
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Chapter 4

Results
Introduction
This chapter states the results of the quantitative analysis of the research study. It
demonstrates the complete PLS-SEM evaluation of the research model. Moreover, this
chapter begins with survey validation, Delphi study, data collection, data screening utilizing
Mahalanobis distance and normality test, and demographics. The rest of the chapter presents
data analysis in two parts, first measurement model testing and then structural model testing.
The measurement model assessment includes convergent validity, construct reliability and
validity, outer loading, discriminant validity, and model fit. The structural model evaluation
includes collinearity, path coefficients, hypothesis summary, total effects, coefficient of
determination, effect size, predictive relevance, important-performance map analysis, and
PLS predict.
Survey Validation and Delphi Study
Upon following the IRB approval process, an IRB approval letter was received (Appendix
C). The Google® Forms assisted in survey creation. A panel of three information security
SMEs evaluated the web-based survey as part of the Delphi study. The purpose of the Delphi
study was to refine the participant survey and seek expert opinion. Literature reviews are
essential and provide valuable information for the survey items; the use of SMEs in the
Delphi method provides crucial guidance and practical knowledge (Gray & Hovav, 2014;
Sumsion, 1998).
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SMEs were selected based on their information security domain experience. The first
SME was a Chief Information Security Officer, the second SME was an Information Security
Manager, and the third SME was an Information Security Analyst. Furthermore, the SMEs
remained anonymous as per the original plan. The survey was distributed to SMEs using
emails on November 30, 2020. Subsequently, SMEs studied the survey and provided
recommendations. All three responses from the SMEs were received by December 5, 2020.
The responses received from the SMEs were mainly optimistic, as they found the survey
effective and coherent. SMEs provided two recommendations. The first recommendation was
to have all the measurement items related to questions mandatory to ensure that participants
responded successfully. The second recommendation was to offer a short explanation of the
constructs in the survey, which helped the participants understand the meanings of the
constructs.
All measurement items in the participant survey resulted in a mandatory entry as per
SMEs’ suggestions. Similarly, a short explanation was added to the construct name for ease
of understanding as per SMEs’ suggestions. Overall, SME recommendations enhanced the
survey with meaningful and valuable updates.
Data Collection
The data collection spanned from January 1, 2021, to January 25, 2021. The survey was
not just limited to information technology professionals. The survey targeted any individuals
who are information technology users. The survey recipients included the range starting from
the individuals who are information technology users to information technology
professionals. The survey recipients were professionals in a professional network, including
LinkedIn connections. The participants' information technology experience ranged from few
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years of experience to decades of experience. Since the participants belonged to a
professional network, the majority had extensive experience with information technology.
Email and LinkedIn were valuable tools to manage the communication for survey
completion. The email content (Appendix D) included the participant survey (Appendix E).
The survey provided clear information about the survey purpose and the expected time to
complete the survey. The survey stated that the participation was voluntary and anonymous,
and responses were confidential.
Data collection utilized the cross-sectional method. The research study used the individual
unit of analysis and purposive sampling approach. The survey was distributed to four
hundred individuals using email. The first phase included emails sent to the four hundred
individuals by January 1st, 2021. Consequently, a total of twenty-five responses were
received by January 8th, 2021. The second phase included emails sent to the same individuals
by January 8th, 2021. Until then, a total of seventy-five responses were received by January
18th, 2021. The third and the last phase included emails sent to the same individuals by
January 18th, 2021. The survey was closed on January 25th, 2021. As a result, a total of one
hundred twenty-nine participants completed the survey with a response rate of 32%.
Data Screening
The data was loaded into Microsoft® Excel to import into IBM® SPSS® Statistics for
pre-analysis of the data.
Mahalanobis Distance
IBM® SPSS® Statistics aided with the pre-analysis activities. The Mahalanobis distance
is a multi-dimensional generalization of the idea that evaluates the distance between a point
and a distribution (Mahalanobis, 1936). Outliers are the values with p < .001 based on the
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Chi-square critical value as per Chi-square (χ²) distribution (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017).
Based on this, Chi-square distribution table criteria was 93.17 using fifty five degrees of
freedom (df=55) and Chi-square critical value (p < .001) (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013).
Mahalanobis distance calculation identified seven outliers (11, 33, 44, 65, 71, 93, 114) with
Mahalanobis distance exceeding the criteria of 93.17 (Appendix F). Mertler and Reinhart
(2017) recommended analyzing extreme values before taking further action. The next step
was to remove five out of the seven extreme outliers (11, 33, 65, 71, 93) and keep two
outliers with the lowest values (44, 114) in the data. Appendix G showed the results of
Mahalanobis distance recalculation. The data showed only two values (42, 109) exceeding
the criteria of 93.17. Further data analysis retained both the data sets.
Normality Test
Normality test results, including normality and scatter plot, ANOVA, histogram, normal
P-P plot, and scatter plot, were analyzed (Appendix H) (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013). The
skewness value showed the symmetry of the distribution, and the kurtosis value showed the
peakedness of the distribution. Skewness and kurtosis decreased after removing five extreme
values (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). As a result, skewness and kurtosis values were
0.645 and 1.453, respectively, in an acceptable range (Kline, 2011). The normal P-P plot and
the normal Q-Q plot showed most of the instances very close to the central diagonal line
demonstrating adequate range (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017; Tabachnick, Fidell, & Ullman,
2007). The R-squared value described the dependent variable variation percentage that the
research model described. The R-squared value of 66% was in the suitable range. The overall
pre-analysis of the data was within an acceptable range.
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Demographics
The demographic variables gathered were gender, age, education, social engineering, and
information security breach exposure. Sixty-six participants were males (51.16%), sixty-two
participants were females (48.06%), and one participant identified in the other category.
Table 3 exhibited the participants' gender distribution.
Table 3
Participants Gender Demographics
Gender

Frequency

Percentage

Male
Female
Other
Total

66
62
1
129

51.16%
48.06%
0.78%
100.00%

The most of participants were between the ages of 45-54 (28.68%), followed by 55-64
(23.26%), 35-44 (22.48%), 25-34 (12.40%), over 65 years (10.08%), and 18-24 (3.1%).
Table 4 displayed the participants' age distribution.
Table 4
Participants Age Demographics
Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Over 65 Years
Total

Frequency

Percentage

4
16
29
37
30
13
129

3.10%
12.40%
22.48%
28.68%
23.26%
10.08%
100.00%

56

The most of participants had a Bachelor’s degree (51.16), followed by a Master’s degree
(18.6%), Associate degree (10.85%), some college and no degree (9.3%), high school
graduate (6.98%), Doctoral degree (2.33%), and some school no degree (0.78%). Table 5
presented the participants' education distribution.
Table 5
Participants Education Demographics
Age
Some School, No Degree
High School Graduate
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree
Doctoral Degree
Total

Frequency

Percentage

1
9
12
14
66
24
3
129

0.78%
6.98%
9.30%
10.85%
51.16%
18.60%
2.33%
100.00%

71.32% of participants had some exposure to social engineering breaches, 24.03% had
extensive exposure to social engineering breaches, and 4.65% had no exposure to social
engineering breaches. Table 6 demonstrated the participants' social engineering breach
exposure demographics.
Table 6
Participants Social Engineering Breach Exposure Demographics
Age
None
Some
Extensive
Total

Frequency

Percentage

6
92
31
129

4.65%
71.32%
24.03%
100.00%
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Data Analysis
The data was loaded into CSV format to import into SmartPLS, version 3.0, for analysis.
In general, there are different approaches for analyzing the formative versus reflective
measurement model. The constructs in this research study were reflective. The research
model evaluation included measurement and structural models (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004;
Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 2000).
Measurement Model
The measurement model signified the relationships between the observed data and the
latent variables. The measurement model estimated the latent variables as its manifest
variables’ weighted sum (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Henseler & Chin, 2010). The measurement
model analysis encompassed an in-depth analysis of the relationships between manifest
indicators. The evaluation included outer loadings, composite reliability and validity,
Cronbach’s alpha (α), average variance extracted (AVE), cross-loadings, and model fit.
Convergent Validity and Outer Loadings
Convergent validity states the degree to which a measure compares positively with the
same construct’s alternative measures (Hair et al., 2017). Convergent validity evaluation
comprised of construct measurement item’s outer loadings assessment. Table 7 exhibited the
initial values for outer loadings for each construct’s measurement items. Moreover, Table 7
highlighted SP04 and SP05 because their values were below 0.40 (Hair et al., 2010). The
further analysis excluded the indicator’s outer loadings with a value below 0.40 (Hair et al.,
2017). The second round of PLS calculation omitted SP04 and SP05.
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Table 7
Initial Outer Loadings
Item

Loading

Item

Loading

Item

Loading

Perceived Severity
PS01
0.84
PS02
0.862
PS03
0.853
PS04
0.944
PS05
0.948

Response efficacy
RE01
0.977
RE02
0.923
RE03
0.935
RE04
0.932
RE05
0.913

Security Policies
SP01
0.959
SP02
0.945
SP03
0.602
SP04
0.332
SP05
0.368

Perceived Vulnerability
PV01
0.826
PV02
0.854
PV03
0.779
PV04
0.898
PV05
0.95

Self-efficacy
SE01
SE02
SE03
SE04
SE05

Protection Motivation
PM01
0.965
PM02
0.902
PM03
0.871
PM04
0.91
PM05
0.898

Fear
FE01
FE02
FE03
FE04
FE05

0.78
0.979
0.805
0.808
0.909

Response Cost
RC01
0.693
RC02
0.817
RC03
0.772
RC04
0.803
RC05
0.762

Maladaptive Rewards
MR01
0.832
MR02
0.895
MR03
0.872
MR04
0.961
MR05
0.92

SETA Program
ST01
0.931
ST02
0.866
ST03
0.873
ST04
0.853
ST05
0.854

0.973
0.943
0.917
0.932
0.937

Protection Behavior
PB01
0.87
PB02
0.903
PB03
0.87
PB04
0.834
PB05
0.856

Table 8 exhibited the final values for outer loadings for each construct’s measurement
items.
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Table 8
Final Outer Loadings
Item

Loading

Item

Loading

Item

Loading

Perceived Severity
PS01
0.84
PS02
0.862
PS03
0.853
PS04
0.944
PS05
0.948

Response efficacy
RE01
0.977
RE02
0.923
RE03
0.935
RE04
0.932
RE05
0.913

Security Policies
SP01
0.958
SP02
0.942
SP03
0.614

Perceived Vulnerability
PV01
0.826
PV02
0.854
PV03
0.779
PV04
0.898
PV05
0.95

Self-efficacy
SE01
SE02
SE03
SE04
SE05

Protection Motivation
PM01
0.965
PM02
0.902
PM03
0.871
PM04
0.91
PM05
0.898

Fear
FE01
FE02
FE03
FE04
FE05

0.78
0.979
0.805
0.808
0.909

Response Cost
RC01
0.693
RC02
0.817
RC03
0.772
RC04
0.803
RC05
0.762

Maladaptive Rewards
MR01
0.832
MR02
0.895
MR03
0.872
MR04
0.961
MR05
0.92

SETA Program
ST01
0.931
ST02
0.866
ST03
0.873
ST04
0.853
ST05
0.854

0.973
0.943
0.917
0.932
0.937

Protection Behavior
PB01
0.871
PB02
0.903
PB03
0.87
PB04
0.833
PB05
0.856
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Construct Reliability and Validity
Table 9 presented internal consistency Cronbach's Alpha (α) statistics. Cronbach’s Alpha
statistics values between 0.60 and 0.70 are considered less than desirable (Hair et al., 2010).
Cronbach’s Alpha statistics values should be greater than 0.70 (Cronbach, 1951). All the
constructs had Cronbach's Alpha greater than 0.70, hence fulfilled construct reliability
criteria.
Convergent validity criteria include Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values required to
be greater than 0.50 (Hair et al., 2010). Convergent validity criteria also comprise that the
AVE's square root must be greater than 0.707 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Götz, LiehrGobbers, & Krafft, 2010). Therefore, all the constructs’ AVE being greater than 0.50 and the
square root of the AVE being greater than 0.707 resulted in acceptable convergent reliability
and validity criteria.
Table 9
Construct Reliability and Validity

Fear
Maladaptive rewards
Protection Behavior
Protection Motivation
Perceived Severity
Perceived Vulnerability
Response Cost
Response Efficacy
Self-efficacy
Security Policies
SETA Program

Cronbach's
Alpha

rho_A

Composite
Reliability

Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)

0.91
0.939
0.917
0.948
0.934
0.914
0.834
0.965
0.967
0.812
0.926

0.926
0.939
0.921
0.95
0.938
0.926
0.857
0.966
0.987
0.943
0.945

0.933
0.954
0.938
0.96
0.95
0.936
0.879
0.973
0.975
0.885
0.943

0.739
0.805
0.752
0.827
0.793
0.746
0.594
0.877
0.885
0.727
0.767
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Discriminant Validity
The discriminant validity requires that a reflective construct has the most solid
relationships with its indicators than the other constructs (Götz et al., 2010). Discriminant
validity measured the degree to which a construct was empirically different from other
constructs (Hair et al., 2017). Three criteria, including cross-loadings, the Fornell-Larcker
criterion, and the Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT), were utilized.
The cross-loading criterion means that a manifest indicator’s outer loading should surpass
its outer loadings on the remaining constructs (Hair et al., 2017). Cross-loadings of the threat
appraisal items are shown in Table 10, coping appraisal items in Table 11, and protection
items in Table 12. Indicators had the most substantial relationship with their assigned latent
construct than the remaining latent constructs (Gefen & Straub, 2005). Each indicator stated
the maximum value with its corresponding construct, whereas all remaining cross-loadings
were lower than its related construct. All indicators had a minimum value of 0.70 (Fornell &
Larcker, 1981). The indicators had the most solid relationship with their assigned latent
construct than with the remaining latent constructs. The difference was at least .10 or more
between the loading and the next highest loading, therefore, satisfying the cross-loading
criterion for discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
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Table 10
Cross-Loadings of Threat Appraisal Items
FE

MR

PB

PM

PS

PV

RC

RE

SE

SP

ST

0.279
0.236
0.258
0.246
0.242

0.461
0.347
0.378
0.461
0.366

0.508
0.365
0.441
0.517
0.474

0.840
0.862
0.853
0.944
0.948

0.43
0.306
0.383
0.388
0.385

-0.047
-0.035
0.062
-0.02
-0.008

0.358
0.257
0.355
0.36
0.367

0.053
0.101
0.104
0.103
0.064

0.119
0.07
0.067
0.07
0.034

0.326
0.342
0.312
0.362
0.312

Perceived Vulnerability
PV01
0.636 0.544
PV02
0.433 0.417
PV03
0.299 0.258
PV04
0.385 0.404
PV05
0.504 0.411

0.598
0.538
0.388
0.489
0.528

0.574
0.597
0.47
0.544
0.576

0.422
0.358
0.299
0.32
0.413

0.826
0.854
0.779
0.898
0.950

0.028
0.148
0.05
0.143
0.077

0.571
0.676
0.441
0.542
0.577

0.196
0.181
0.22
0.237
0.189

0.125
0.037
0.082
0.185
0.062

0.438
0.408
0.202
0.374
0.357

0.207 0.385
0.339 0.54
0.351 0.535
0.383 0.51
0.381 0.574

0.33
0.545
0.473
0.528
0.58

0.362
0.54
0.452
0.448
0.583

0.349
0.506
0.485
0.464
0.49

-0.067
-0.025
-0.017
0.052
0.034

0.251
0.432
0.422
0.461
0.524

0.037
0.155
0.163
0.094
0.205

-0.049
0.005
0.032
0.027
0.124

0.307
0.411
0.318
0.342
0.477

Maladaptive Rewards
MR01
0.357 0.832 0.462
MR02
0.382 0.895 0.451
MR03
0.323 0.872 0.456
MR04
0.362 0.961 0.47
MR05
0.343 0.920
0.5

0.328
0.334
0.326
0.335
0.351

0.165
0.27
0.287
0.278
0.27

0.369
0.442
0.484
0.446
0.431

0.05
0.126
0.155
0.094
0.09

0.463
0.414
0.352
0.438
0.416

0.157
0.181
0.165
0.129
0.164

0.161
0.163
0.151
0.184
0.137

0.457
0.546
0.484
0.526
0.528

Perceived Severity
PS01
0.489
PS02
0.508
PS03
0.476
PS04
0.545
PS05
0.493

Fear
FE01
FE02
FE03
FE04
FE05

0.780
0.979
0.805
0.808
0.909
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Table 11
Cross-Loadings of Coping Appraisal Items
FE

MR

PB

PM

PS

PV

RC

RE

SE

SP

ST

Response Efficacy
RE01
0.504 0.468
RE02
0.434 0.442
RE03
0.414 0.441
RE04
0.477 0.445
RE05
0.498 0.379

0.65
0.605
0.592
0.642
0.668

0.708
0.654
0.619
0.687
0.663

0.388
0.392
0.31
0.385
0.313

0.66
0.587
0.603
0.596
0.631

0.151
0.214
0.215
0.197
0.149

0.977
0.923
0.935
0.932
0.913

0.251
0.335
0.275
0.272
0.219

0.186
0.23
0.191
0.221
0.173

0.456
0.428
0.404
0.433
0.448

Self-efficacy
SE01
0.212
SE02
0.113
SE03
0.146
SE04
0.124
SE05
0.139

0.257
0.169
0.118
0.107
0.15

0.429
0.317
0.357
0.276
0.312

0.374
0.293
0.282
0.269
0.243

0.139
0.066
0.095
0.067
0.061

0.288
0.242
0.177
0.19
0.177

0.148
0.146
0.112
0.091
0.051

0.392
0.261
0.226
0.212
0.219

0.973 0.24
0.943 0.172
0.917
0.2
0.932 0.159
0.937 0.169

0.359
0.304
0.263
0.201
0.267

Response Cost
RC01
0.031
RC02
-0.076
RC03
0.031
RC04
0.052
RC05
-0.018

0.127
0.066
0.077
0.087
0.122

0.065
0.133
0.143
0.142
0.075

0.079
0.199
0.166
0.191
0.135

-0.062
-0.046
-0.038
0.009
0.087

0.062
0.076
0.109
0.06
0.087

0.693
0.817
0.772
0.803
0.762

0.089
0.168
0.215
0.139
0.114

0.059
0.138
0.143
0.109
-0.03

0.153
0.097
0.09
0.189
0.099

-0.023
0.015
0.022
-0.053
-0.04
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Table 12
Cross-Loadings of Protection Items
FE

MR

PB

PM

PS

PV

RC

RE

SE

SP

ST

0.155 0.242 0.221 0.958
0.169 0.152 0.185 0.942
0.046 0.15 0.073 0.614

0.154
0.151
0.107

Security Policies
SP01
0.059 0.22
SP02
-0.002 0.112
SP03
0.062 0.108

0.156 0.166
0.1 0.151
0.14 0.127 0.051 0.071
0.06 0.119 0.052 0.04

SETA Program
ST01
0.412
ST02
0.453
ST03
0.33
ST04
0.352
ST05
0.345

0.628
0.451
0.409
0.509
0.503

0.479
0.535
0.472
0.355
0.314

0.355
0.483
0.398
0.268
0.207

0.329
0.403
0.357
0.227
0.261

0.467
0.375
0.325
0.355
0.312

0.027
-0.001
-0.041
-0.029
-0.052

0.415
0.538
0.445
0.295
0.242

0.335
0.239
0.246
0.27
0.229

0.16
0.179
0.211
0.046
0.061

0.931
0.866
0.873
0.853
0.854

Protection Motivation
PM01
0.568 0.356
PM02
0.544 0.288
PM03
0.513 0.202
PM04
0.5 0.427
PM05
0.527 0.402

0.695
0.624
0.588
0.685
0.685

0.965
0.902
0.871
0.91
0.898

0.488
0.443
0.48
0.464
0.495

0.594
0.57
0.506
0.647
0.605

0.172
0.182
0.131
0.209
0.265

0.663
0.602
0.564
0.704
0.695

0.264
0.1
0.273 0.12
0.242 0.066
0.36 0.176
0.294 0.252

0.367
0.308
0.317
0.412
0.449

Protection Behavior
PB01
0.551 0.476
PB02
0.583 0.502
PB03
0.483 0.444
PB04
0.398 0.39
PB05
0.563 0.442

0.871
0.903
0.87
0.833
0.856

0.678 0.429 0.574
0.648 0.38 0.524
0.572
0.4 0.487
0.54
0.3 0.431
0.678 0.451 0.566

0.139
0.157
0.131
0.104
0.131

0.661
0.576
0.523
0.49
0.657

0.253
0.406
0.385
0.326
0.226

0.424
0.486
0.452
0.427
0.418

0.022
0.169
0.237
0.229
0.019

Fornell and Larcker criterion is a reliable method for evaluating discriminant validity and
preventing multicollinearity issues (Hair et al., 2010). Discriminant validity requires the
square root of every AVE value related to each latent construct to be more significant than
any correlation amongst any latent constructs pair (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Every AVE
square root for each latent construct was greater than the correlation with any other latent
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construct, as exhibited in Table 13, meeting the Fornell and Larcker criterion requirements of
discriminant validity.
Table 13
Fornell-Larcker Criterion

FE
MR
PB
PM
PS
PV
RC
RE
SE
SP
ST

FE

MR

PB

PM

PS

PV

RC

0.859
0.395
0.6
0.583
0.565
0.54
0
0.498
0.16
0.04
0.438

0.897
0.522
0.374
0.284
0.485
0.115
0.465
0.177
0.177
0.567

0.867
0.723
0.455
0.599
0.154
0.675
0.366
0.15
0.509

0.91
0.521
0.645
0.213
0.713
0.317
0.16
0.41

0.891
0.427
-0.012
0.383
0.095
0.081
0.372

0.863
0.102
0.658
0.234
0.113
0.424

0.771
0.197
0.121
0.159
-0.018

RE

SE

SP

ST

0.936
0.288 0.941
0.214 0.203 0.853
0.464 0.302 0.162 0.876

Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio is a dependable criterion to complement the FornellLarcker (1981) and cross-loadings to evaluate discriminant validity (Henseler, Ringle, &
Sarstedt, 2015). The complete bootstrapping function in SmartPLS 3.0 generated the HTMT
value to assess discriminant validity. The bootstrap calculation, with the number of cases
parameter equal to 5,000, two-tailed test type, and significance level of 0.05, was performed.
Table 14 showed the HTMT ratio evaluation results. As per the HTMT criterion for
discriminant validity, the HTMT statistic confidence interval did not surpass 1 for all
combinations of constructs (Hair et al., 2017). Discriminant validity between latent
constructs was adequate as per Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) criterion.
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Table 14
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT)

MR -> FE
PB -> FE
PB -> MR
PM -> FE
PM -> MR
PM -> PB
PS -> FE
PS -> MR
PS -> PB
PS -> PM
PV -> FE
PV -> MR
PV -> PB
PV -> PM
PV -> PS
RC -> FE
RC -> MR
RC -> PB
RC -> PM
RC -> PS
RC -> PV
RE -> FE
RE -> MR
RE -> PB
RE -> PM
RE -> PS
RE -> PV

Original Sample 2.50% 97.50%
Sample
Mean
(O)
(M)
0.42
0.422 0.246
0.581 RE -> RC
0.645
0.647 0.537
0.738 SE -> FE
0.56
0.556 0.353
0.707 SE -> MR
0.618
0.616 0.503
0.715 SE -> PB
0.391
0.389 0.184
0.572 SE -> PM
0.769
0.764 0.626
0.867 SE -> PS
0.604
0.604 0.462
0.729 SE -> PV
0.303
0.309 0.134
0.483 SE -> RC
0.486
0.485 0.331
0.621 SE -> RE
0.551
0.55 0.383
0.694 SP -> FE
0.569
0.565 0.415
0.694 SP -> MR
0.51
0.508 0.322
0.667 SP -> PB
0.64
0.633 0.476
0.762 SP -> PM
0.686
0.678 0.542
0.786 SP -> PS
0.453
0.45 0.284
0.596 SP -> PV
0.077
0.155 0.088
0.269 SP -> RC
0.144
0.196
0.08
0.419 SP -> RE
0.163
0.205 0.083
0.445 SP -> SE
0.225
0.243 0.084
0.492 ST -> FE
0.086
0.149 0.083
0.263 ST -> MR
0.121
0.184 0.088
0.387 ST -> PB
0.519
0.518
0.39
0.628 ST -> PM
0.489
0.484 0.296
0.641 ST -> PS
0.712
0.7 0.532
0.831 ST -> PV
0.742
0.735 0.596
0.837 ST -> RC
0.401
0.397 0.213
0.55 ST -> RE
0.693
0.688 0.518
0.817 ST -> SE
ST -> SP

Original Sample 2.50%
Sample
Mean
(O)
(M)
0.21
0.23
0.08
0.159
0.18 0.066
0.179
0.19 0.063
0.384
0.38 0.195
0.323
0.32 0.111
0.096
0.13
0.05
0.246
0.25 0.075
0.135
0.17 0.081
0.289
0.28 0.084
0.088
0.14 0.074
0.197
0.22
0.07
0.171
0.23 0.096
0.18
0.2 0.066
0.091
0.14 0.054
0.128
0.18 0.085
0.197
0.24 0.109
0.241
0.25 0.071
0.208
0.23 0.075
0.465
0.46 0.307
0.611
0.61 0.414
0.533
0.52 0.317
0.414
0.41 0.208
0.386
0.39 0.225
0.442
0.44 0.247
0.058
0.15 0.077
0.466
0.46 0.236
0.312
0.31 0.114
0.174
0.21 0.079

Model Fit
Model Fit included Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) assessment.
SRMR is an absolute measure of fit and the standardized variance between the predicted

97.50%

0.482
0.342
0.377
0.559
0.506
0.273
0.443
0.346
0.487
0.267
0.463
0.438
0.424
0.313
0.354
0.432
0.492
0.419
0.598
0.768
0.69
0.589
0.532
0.621
0.293
0.639
0.506
0.431
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correlation and the observed correlation (Henseler, Hubona, & Ray, 2016). A value of zero
specifies perfect fit, given that the SRMR is an absolute measure of fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
SRMR value of less than 0.08 is an acceptable value (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Table 15 showed
model fit results. The SRMR value was 0.0686 for the estimated model, resulting in a good
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Table 15
Model Fit

SRMR
d_ULS
d_G
Chi-Square
NFI

Saturated Model

Estimated Model

0.065
5.998
5.542
2731.608
0.686

0.074
7.765
5.66
2752.761
0.684

In conclusion, the measurement model analysis was sufficient to begin the next set of
investigations for the structural model.
Structural Model
The structural model signified the relationships amongst the latent constructs (Wong,
2013). Evaluation incorporated collinearity statistics (VIF), coefficient of determination (R2),
path coefficients (β), effect size (f2), predictive relevance (Q2), Importance-Performance Map
Analysis (IPMA), and PLS predict (Q2 Predict).
Collinearity
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), a measure of collinearity, provided the reciprocal of the
tolerance (Hair et al., 2017). In most cases, the VIF values lower than five have been
considered acceptable (Hair et al., 2017). Table 16 presented collinearity statistics (VIF)
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results. The VIF values were below five for the estimated model, representing acceptable
collinearity.
Table 16
Collinearity Statistics (VIF)
Fear Protection Motivation Protection Behavior
Perceived severity
Perceived vulnerability
Fear
Maladaptive rewards
Response efficacy
Self-efficacy
Response Cost
SETA Program
Security Policies
Protection Motivation

1.223
1.223

1.525
2.100
1.848
1.407
2.048
1.103
1.065
1.216
1.038
1.215

Path Coefficients
Path coefficient values range between -1 to +1, with 0 or close to 0 stating statistically
insignificant impact (Hair et al., 2017). The individual path coefficients were derived as the
following steps, as shown in Table 17. The evaluation of algebraic signs and values of path
coefficients followed next. t statistics and p-value evaluation demonstrated the significance
of the path coefficient at either the .05, .01 or .001 confidence interval levels.
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Table 17
Path Coefficients
Original
Sample (O)
Fear
PS -> FE
PV -> FE
Protection Motivation
FE -> PM
PS -> PM
PV -> PM
MR -> PM
RE -> PM
SE -> PM
RC -> PM
Protection Behavior
ST -> PB
SP -> PB
PM -> PB

Sample
Mean (M)

Standard Deviation
(STDEV)

t Statistics
p(|O/STDEV|) Values

0.408
0.366

0.408
0.37

0.074
0.076

5.488
4.786

<.001
<.001

0.176
0.194
0.202
-0.064
0.395
0.107
0.111

0.175
0.192
0.194
-0.058
0.392
0.109
0.119

0.076
0.083
0.084
0.069
0.084
0.055
0.065

2.313
2.325
2.391
0.932
4.702
1.936
1.709

0.021
0.020
0.017
0.351
<.001
0.053
0.088

0.254
0.010
0.617

0.249
0.013
0.615

0.098
0.07
0.075

2.593
0.139
8.273

0.01
0.89
<.001

Figure 2 showed the final research model results.
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Figure 2. Final Research Model
Hypothesis Summary
T statistics values should be greater than 1.96 (Two-Tailed test type and significance level
of 0.05) to support a hypothesis (Hair et al., 2017). The direct effect of perceived severity on
fear was statistically significant (β= 0.408, p<0.001, t= 5.488), supporting hypothesis H1. This
result indicated that the degree to which a user believes in the danger would create
substantial damage impacts their fear, as demonstrated by the work of Floyd et al. (2000).
Similarly, the direct effect of perceived vulnerability on fear was statistically significant (β=
0.366, p<0.001, t=4.786), supporting hypothesis H2. This result specified that a user’s

credence in their exposure to social engineering impacts their emotional response to that
danger, as demonstrated by the work of Floyd et al. (2000). The direct effect of fear on
protection motivation was statistically significant (β= 0.176, p<0.05, t=2.313), supporting
hypothesis H3. This result implied that fear could motivate a user to take protective action
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against social engineering breaches, as established by the research of Rogers (1975) and
Witte (1994).
The direct effect of perceived severity on protection motivation was statistically
significant (β=0.194, p<<0.05, t=2.325), supporting hypothesis H4. This effect indicated that
the users’ belief in the degree of substantial damage impacts their motivation to exhibit
protection behavior, as shown by the research of Crossler and Bélanger (2014). Additionally,
the direct effect of perceived vulnerability on protection motivation was statistically
significant (β=0.202, p<0.05, t=2.391), supporting hypothesis H5. This effect specified a
user’s susceptibility in their exposure to social engineering impacts their motivation to
exhibit protection behavior, as demonstrated by the work of Ifinedo (2012).
The direct effect of maladaptive rewards on protection motivation was statistically
insignificant (β=-0.064, p=0.351, t=0.932), not supporting hypothesis H6. This result specified
that the perceived benefits of not executing protection behaviors to prevent social
engineering breaches did not influence users’ motivation to perform these protection
behaviors (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). The direct effect of response efficacy on
protection motivation was statistically significant (β=0.395, p<0.001, t=4.702), supporting
hypothesis H7. This result implied that users’ confidence in the efficiency of a protection
behavior to prevent social engineering breach is correlated to their motivation to exhibit these
behaviors, as demonstrated by the research of Yoon et al. (2012).
The direct effect of self-efficacy on protection motivation was statistically insignificant
(β=0.107, p=0.053, t=1.936), not supporting hypothesis H8. This result implied that users’
belief in their ability to perform protection action does not impact their motivation to perform
the protection behavior (Siponen et al., 2010). In contrast, the direct effect of response cost
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on protection motivation was statistically insignificant (β=0.111, p=0.088, t=1.709), not
supporting hypothesis H9. This result showed that users’ perception of the costs acquired by
execution of protection has no significant influence on their motivation to perform these
protection behaviors (Ng et al., 2009). The direct effect of protection motivation on
protection behavior was statistically significant (β=0.617, p<0.001, t=8.273), supporting
hypothesis H10. This effect implied that users’ motivation to perform protection behaviors to
prevent social engineering breaches is correlated to their recital of these behaviors, as
demonstrated by the research of Boss et al. (2015).
The direct effect of the SETA program on protection behavior was statistically significant
(β=0.254, p=0.01, t=2.593), supporting hypothesis H11. This result showed that an
organization’s SETA program significantly impacts users’ protection behavior to prevent
social engineering breaches (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007). The direct effect of security policies
on protection behavior was statistically insignificant (β=0..01, p=0.89, t=0.139), not
supporting hypothesis H12. This result showed that an organization’s security policies do not
significantly impact users’ protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches (Lee et
al., 2004). One of the reasons could be that the user is not well-aware of the organization’s

security policies. Table 18 presented support for the hypothesized relationships.
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Table 18
Hypothesis Summary
Hypothesis
H1 Perceived severity is positively associated with fear.
H2 Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with fear.
H3 Fear is positively associated with protection motivation.
H4 Perceived severity is positively associated with protection motivation.
H5 Perceived vulnerability is positively associated with protection motivation.
H6 Maladaptive rewards are negatively associated with protection motivation.
H7 Response efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation.
H8 Self-efficacy is positively associated with protection motivation.
H9 Response cost is negatively associated with protection motivation.
H10 Protection motivation is positively associated with protection behavior.
H11 SETA program is positively associated with protection behavior.
H12 Security policies are positively associated with protection behavior.

Result
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported

Total Effects
Bootstrapping utilizes resampling methods to determine the significance of PLS
coefficients. PLS-SEM relies on a bootstrap procedure to make statistical inferences.
Bootstrapping output evaluation encompassed the direct, indirect, and total effects. The total
effect was the sum of direct and indirect effects, as shown in Table 19. Direct effects were
the relationships between two latent constructs directly connected by a single-headed arrow
(Hair et al., 2017). On the other hand, indirect effects were the relationships between two
latent constructs not directly connected by a single-headed arrow; though, a third construct
intervened (Hair et al., 2017).
The response efficacy had the maximum direct effect on protection motivation than any
other independent constructs (i.e., perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear,
maladaptive rewards, self-efficacy, and response costs). Therefore, the most significant
impact on protection motivation is a user’s belief in the efficiency of the recommended
security measures to prevent social engineering threats.
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Table 19
Total Effects

Original
Sample
Sample (O) Mean (M)
Fear
PS -> FE
PV -> FE

Standard Deviation t Statistics
(STDEV)
(|O/STDEV|)

p-Values

0.408
0.366

0.408
0.37

0.074
0.076

5.488
4.786

<.001
<.001

Protection Motivation
FE -> PM
0.176
PS -> PM
0.265
PV -> PM
0.266
MR -> PM
-0.064
RE -> PM
0.395
SE -> PM
0.107
RC -> PM
0.111

0.175
0.262
0.26
-0.058
0.392
0.109
0.119

0.076
0.075
0.075
0.069
0.084
0.055
0.065

2.313
3.554
3.555
0.932
4.702
1.936
1.709

0.021
<.001
<.001
0.351
<.001
0.053
0.088

Protection Behavior
ST -> PB
0.254
SP -> PB
0.01
PM -> PB
0.617
FE -> PB
0.109
PS -> PB
0.164
PV -> PB
0.164
MR -> PB
-0.039
RE -> PB
0.244
SE -> PB
0.066
RC -> PB
0.069

0.249
0.013
0.615
0.109
0.161
0.16
-0.035
0.241
0.067
0.073

0.098
0.07
0.075
0.051
0.051
0.05
0.042
0.059
0.036
0.041

2.593
0.139
8.273
2.119
3.241
3.31
0.941
4.157
1.838
1.682

0.01
0.89
<.001
0.034
0.001
0.001
0.347
<.001
0.066
0.093

Coefficient of Determination
R2 results, also known as the coefficient of determination, provided a measure of the
predictive power and fitness to the observed data in the regression analysis (Hair et al., 2017;
Sarstedt, Wilczynski, & Melewar, 2013). R2 values assessed the exogenous latent variable’s
cumulative effects on the endogenous latent variables as one of the essential steps for
prediction analysis (Hair et al., 2017; Roldán & Sánchez-Franco, 2012). R2 values of 0.67,
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0.33, and 0.19 are substantial, moderate, and weak, correspondingly (Chin, 1998). Table 20
exhibited R2 results for the estimated model. The estimated model in this research study
could explain 42.8% of the variance in fear, 64.9 % of the variance in protection motivation,
and 57.7% of the variance in protection behavior. As a result, R2 results exceeded the
moderate level threshold recommended for the coefficient of determination.
Table 20
R Square

Fear
Protection Motivation
Protection Behavior

R Square

R Square Adjusted

0.428
0.649
0.577

0.419
0.628
0.566

Effect Size
Effect size (f2) evaluation provided the degree to which exogenous latent constructs
contributed to the coefficient of determination of endogenous constructs. The f2 effect size
values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are evaluated as small, median, and large effects (Hair et al.,
2017). Subsequently, effect size values of less than 0.02 are not affected (Hair et al., 2017).
Table 21 presented the effect size of the estimated model.
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Table 21
f Square

Fear
Perceived severity
Perceived vulnerability
Fear
Maladaptive rewards
Response efficacy
Self-efficacy
Response Cost
SETA Program
Security Policies
Protection Motivation

Protection
Motivation

0.239
0.191

Protection
Behavior

0.07
0.055
0.048
0.008
0.218
0.03
0.033
0.125
0
0.74

Predictive Relevance
The blindfolding procedure provided the predictive relevance (Q2) values of latent
variables. The blindfolding process evaluated the Q2 of the path model by re-using the
samples, systematically removing data points, and delivering a prediction of their original
values (Hair et al., 2017). The blindfolding calculation encompassed an omission distance of
seven. Table 22 displayed the results of the blindfolding. Overall, the Q2 values were above
zero, confirming the predictive relevance of the estimated model (Hair et al., 2017).
Table 22
Q Square
Q Square
Fear
Protection Behavior
Protection Motivation

0.302
0.417
0.517
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Important-Performance Map Analysis
Importance-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA) outspreads the estimated model by
adding the performance of each construct into the interpretation. It provides the evaluation on
two dimensions, including importance and performance. IPMA for protection behavior
incorporated selecting direct predecessors of the chosen target construct. Figure 3 presented
IPMA results.

Figure 3. Important-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA)
PLS Predict
PLS predict assessment encompassed ten folds and repetitions to predict PLS path models
and evaluate their predictive performance. PLS (partial least squares) model, as well as LM
(linear regression) model evaluation, incorporated a comparison between the root means
squared error (RMSE) and the mean absolute error (MAE). Table 23 presented the PLS
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predict results. The PLS Q2 values were bigger than zero, and the Q2 LM values were lower
than the Q2 PLS values, which confirmed acceptable PLS predict assessment.
Table 23
PLS Predict Assessment

PB01
PB02
PB03
PB04
PB05

RMSE
0.928
0.931
1.044
1.197
0.845

PLS
MAE Q²_predict
0.732
0.412
0.734
0.395
0.832
0.345
0.932
0.273
0.69
0.409

RMSE
1.074
1.047
1.244
1.483
0.991

LM
MAE Q²_predict RMSE
0.846
0.212 -0.146
0.823
0.234 -0.116
0.997
0.069
-0.2
1.159
-0.116 -0.286
0.783
0.187 -0.146

PLS-LM
MAE Q²_predict
-0.114
0.2
-0.089
0.161
-0.165
0.276
-0.227
0.389
-0.093
0.222

Appendix I showed additional comments collected from the participants. Participants
captured their behavior to protect themselves from social engineering breaches in these
comments. The additional comments were in synchronization with the constructs of the
supported hypothesis. Here are the additional comments that supported the constructs,
perceived severity (additional comment number 8), perceived vulnerability (additional
comment number 11), fear (additional comment number 13), response efficacy (additional
comment number 5), protection motivation (additional comment number 10), SETA program
(additional comment number 3), and protection behavior (additional comment number 1).
Summary
This chapter began with a discussion of the survey validation and Delphi study.
Additionally, data screening comprised of Mahalanobis distance and Normality test. The
Mahalanobis distance and Normality test were re-executed after removing five outliers.
Furthermore, the chapter showed descriptive statistics related to the participants’ gender, age,
education demographics, and social engineering breach exposure background.

79

The measurement model was assessed by evaluating outer loadings, composite reliability
and validity, Cronbach's alpha (α), average variance extracted (AVE), cross-loadings, and
model fit. Further analysis removed the indicator’s outer loadings with a value below 0.40.
All the constructs had Cronbach's Alpha (α) greater than 0.70, meeting construct reliability
criteria. All average variance extracted (AVE) values were greater than 0.50, meeting
convergent validity criteria. All three criteria, including cross-loadings, the Fornell-Larcker
criterion, and the Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT), were utilized to validate discriminant
validity. Lastly, the SRMR value was less than 0.08, confirming the model fit and concluding
measurement mode evaluation.
The structural model was assessed by evaluating collinearity statistics (VIF), coefficient
of determination (R2), path coefficients (β), effect size (f2), predictive relevance (Q2),
Importance-Performance Map Analysis (IPMA), and PLS predict (Q2 Predict). The VIF
values were lower than five, confirming collinearity. In addition, the path coefficients and
total effects were analyzed and resulted in supporting eight out of twelve hypotheses. The
estimated model in this research study could explain 42.8% of the variance in fear, 64.9 % of
the variance in protection motivation, and 57.7% of the variance in protection behavior. The
Q2 values were above zero, confirming the predictive relevance. IPMA provided the
evaluation on two dimensions, including importance and performance. PLS predict
assessment showed acceptable values concluding structural model assessment. The next
chapter comprises a comprehensive discussion, limitations, implications, recommendations,
and conclusion of the research findings.
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Chapter 5

Discussion, Limitations, Implications, Recommendations, and Conclusion
Introduction
This research study examines the influences on users' protection behavior to prevent
social engineering breaches and encompasses the development and empirical evaluation of a
research model based on PMT full nomology, SETA program, and security policies. The
previous chapter comprehended the quantitative research results from this research study.
This chapter offers a thorough discussion of the results learned in the last chapter.
This discussion includes influences on fear, influences on protection motivation,
influences on protection behavior, support for the research model, and support for the
research question. The chapter then presents limitations, implications, contributions to
theory, contributions to practice, and recommendations. Finally, the last part of the chapter
provides conclusions and a thesis summary.
Discussion
Social engineering is one of the most significant threats organizations face today. Social
engineering involves persuading users to provide sensitive information to perform
unauthorized actions to achieve illegitimate financial advances (Dodge et al., 2007). Despite
several research studies completed in recent times in the social engineering area, there is a
scarcity of theory-grounded empirical studies to prevent social engineering breaches. An
empirical investigation of protection motivation and protection behavior to prevent social
engineering breaches utilizing PMT full nomology, SETA program, and security policies did
not exist; henceforth, this research model originated.
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Influences on Fear
A robust and flexible theory, protection motivation theory, was primarily designed to
explicate fear appeals (Rogers, 1975). Prior research leveraging PMT did not include the
critical parameter of fear (Alashoor et al., 2017; Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Youn, 2005). Fear is
an adverse sentiment on behalf of a response that ascends from diagnosing a threat (Boss et
al., 2015). Fear takes different forms, including scare, stimulation, distress, and alarm.
Similarly, fear is emotional tension, anxiety, nervousness, shock, provocation, apprehension,
or uneasiness users feel when they are scared of future security threats that may cause them
damage.
This research study derived that perceived severity positively impacted fear. Fear
concerning perceived severity played an impactful part in PMT. The more fear users feel
about a threat, the more severe the user believes the danger is (Milne et al., 2000). Prior
research derived a similar positive relationship between perceived severity and fear
(Arachchilage & Love, 2013; Boss et al., 2015; Liang & Xue, 2010). Therefore, the
perceived severity envisaging fear matches the results of this research study (Boss et al.,
2015).
This research study derived that perceived vulnerability positively impacted fear (Boss et
al., 2015; Chen & Zahedi, 2016). Fear concerning perceived vulnerability played a crucial
role in PMT. Specifically, the more fear users feel of a threat; the more vulnerable users
believe themself to be (Milne et al., 2000). Perceived vulnerability foreseeing fear matches
this research study's outcomes (Arachchilage & Love, 2013; Boss et al., 2015). The influence
of perceived severity on fear was more significant than that of perceived vulnerability in this
research study, consistent with Arachchilage and Love (2013).
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Influences on Protection Motivation
This research study found that perceived severity positively impacted user’s protection
motivation, unswerving with the empirical testing conducted in the prior literature (Chen &
Zahedi, 2016). PMT's previous research found perceived severity to have a non-significant
influence (Yang et al., 2017). In addition, this research study exhibited that perceived
severity is vital for users' protection motivation to follow suggested security measures to
avert social engineering breaches. Subsequently, this is reinforced by previous research in
perceived severity applying PMT. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) posited the positive
impact of perceived severity on protection motivation in research conducted in Australia.
Similarly, Johnston et al. (2015) hypothesized a positive effect of perceived severity on
protection motivation in a study in Finland.
This research study found a positive impact of perceived vulnerability on user’s protection
motivation similar to former PMT evaluations (Alashoor et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017). This
research study showed that perceived vulnerability is a vital influence on users' protection
motivation to follow recommended security measures to prevent social engineering breaches.
Earlier research in perceived vulnerability utilizing PMT supported this finding. Lee (2011)
deliberated intention to adopt an antiplagiarism system and derived positive impact of
perceived vulnerability employing PMT corroborating this research study. Similarly,
Mohamed and Ahmad (2012) showed a positive influence of perceived vulnerability utilizing
PMT by studying social networking sites in Malaysia.
This research study derived a positive impact of fear on users’ protection behavior
analogous to prior PMT research (Zhang & McDowell, 2009). While most of the extant
research did not embrace the crucial aspect of fear while leveraging PMT (Lee et al., 2008),
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this research study incorporated fear appeal, considering it vital for PMT. This research study
verified that the higher the fear, the more likely the user will be exhibiting protection
motivation to follow recommended information security measures, thus substantiating the
critical factor of fear appeal (Milne et al., 2000). Furthermore, Arachchilage and Love (2013)
also posited a positive relationship between fear and protection motivation, corroborating this
research study's discoveries.
This research study did not find a negative impact of maladaptive rewards on protection
motivation, which corresponds to previous research (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015).
Preceding research leveraging PMT did not comprise the impact of maladaptive rewards in
their research model (Alashoor et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2017). Marett et al.
(2011) did not find any significant relationship between extrinsic rewards and the revelation
of sensitive information. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) conducted an empirical
investigation incorporating PMT in Australia and derived a non-significant influence of
maladaptive rewards.
This research study highlighted a positive impact of response efficacy on protection
motivation corresponding with previous research (Ifinedo, 2012; Lwin et al., 2012; Yang et
al., 2017). However, some incidences of preceding research leveraging PMT did not
comprise the impact of response efficacy in their research model (Alashoor et al., 2017). It
was evident from this research study that response efficacy played an impactful role in
protection motivation matching with former research (Chen & Zahedi, 2016; Crossler et al.,
2014; Meso et al., 2013). Boehmer et al. (2015) and Lee (2011) posited a positive impact of
response efficacy confirming user's belief in the efficiency of the suggested security
measures impacts protection motivation. Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1989) asserted that
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response efficacy positively impacted protection motivation, verifying findings from this
research study.
It is apparent from this research study that the positive relationship between self-efficacy
and protection motivation did not confirm, similar to preceding research (Alashoor et al.,
2017). There was evidence in the prior research of a positive relationship between selfefficacy and protection motivation (Yang et al., 2017). Preceding research leveraging PMT
did not comprise the impact of self-efficacy in their research model (Youn, 2005). The
discovery of this research study conformed to the prior literature (Youn, 2009).
One of the thought-provoking findings of this research study was the dynamics between
self-efficacy and response efficacy. Prior research studies frequently showed self-efficacy as
a more critical factor than response efficacy in the information security arena (Crossler et al.,
2013). Conversely, this research study highlighted that response efficacy is more vital than
self-efficacy. This research study also emphasized that response efficacy has the highest
impact on protection motivation than any other construct in the research model. Response
efficacy represents a user’s views of the effectiveness of recommended information security
measures to prevent social engineering breaches. In comparison, self-efficacy represents a
user’s confidence in their capacity to execute recommended information security measures.
Users must understand how recommended security measures secure an organization and
how information security investments lead to a return. Even though some users understand
the dangers and potential penalties of not following recommended information security
measures, they are still not keen on following them. Frequently, users do not believe that
their organization has comprehensive measures and controls to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of organizational information. Henceforth, this research study
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provides critical evidence helping organizations to improve protection behavior by carefully
crafting a strategy to enhance users' response efficacy.
This research study did not find a negative relationship between response cost and
protection motivation, similar to preceding research (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ng et al., 2009).
Preceding research leveraging PMT did not encompass the influence of response cost
(Alashoor et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2008; Youn, 2005). Ifinedo (2012) conducted a study in
Canada and found a non-significant impact of response cost utilizing PMT. Crossler et al.
(2014) instituted a non-significant impact of response cost employing PMT. Thus, response
efficacy was the most critical impact on the coping appraisal for the protection motivation to
prevent social engineering breaches found by this research study.
Influences on Protection Behavior
This research study found a positive impact of protection motivation on protection
behavior to prevent social engineering breaches like erstwhile PMT research (Posey et al.,
2015). The protection motivation to protection behavior hypothesis had the highest impact of
any other hypothesis in this research model. It had emerged as the relationship with the
highest path coefficient and t statistics value. Moreover, this indicates that users’ motivation
to perform protection behaviors against social engineering threats is strongly associated with
their actual performance of these behaviors. Conclusions from previous research, such as
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and Pahnila et al. (2007), contended that the protection
motivation positively influenced the protection behavior to prevent the information security
breach corroborating the discoveries from this research study.
This research study led to a positive relationship between the SETA program and
protection motivation like former research (Posey et al., 2015). One of the best defenses
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against social engineering threats is layers of well-designed multi-dimensional SETA
programs, helping users perceive and retort the attacks in the most appropriate way. The
comprehensive SETA program defenses digital assets for the endurance and success of the
organization and aims that every user turns out to be a portion of security solutions and not
security problems (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2015; Heartfield & Loukas, 2015).
Subsequently, the SETA program provides a security-based foundation for users and
positively influences users' protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches (Posey
et al., 2015).
This research study did not find a positive relationship between security policies and
protection motivation. Security policy in an organization outlines how to protect
organizational digital assets from information security threats, including social engineering
breaches (Moody et al., 2018). Chen et al. (2015) asserted that the SETA program positively
impacts an organization's security policies; therefore, a better SETA program improves
security policies. The SETA program and security policies improve users' protection
behavior to follow information security measures to prevent social engineering breaches
(Chen et al., 2015).
Support for the Research Model
The research model utilized PLS-SEM because the investigation included verifying a
theoretical framework from a prediction perspective. The t statistics value greater than equal
to 1.96 with the two-tailed test at a 5% significance level indicates support of a hypothesis
(Hair et al., 2017). Perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, and fear comprised threat
appraisal and positively impacted the user’s protection motivation to follow recommended
security measures to prevent social engineering breaches.
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Response efficacy covered coping appraisal and positively impacted protection
motivation. Response efficacy had the highest impact on protection motivation than any
other individual constructs. At the same time, hypotheses of maladaptive rewards, selfefficacy, response cost, and security policies remained non-supported. The SETA program
had a positive impact on the protection behavior. Moreover, protection motivation positively
impacted the protection behavior with the highest t statistics value in the entire research
model.
Support for the Research Question
This research study addressed the following main research question:
RQ: What are the factors influencing the users’ information security protection behavior
towards social engineering breaches?
The discoveries and conclusions from this research study demonstrated factors
influencing users' protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. Overall, this
research study assessed impacts of threat appraisal (perceived severity, perceived
vulnerability, fear, and maladaptive rewards), coping appraisal (response efficacy, selfefficacy, and response cost), protection motivation, SETA program, and security policies on
users’ protection behavior to prevent social engineering breaches.
Limitations
There are some limitations related to this research study, like most academic research
studies. First and foremost, participants of this research study were limited to those who had
access to the computer or mobile, considering this research study involved an online survey.
Assuming that this research study involved social engineering and information security,
participants with access to the computer or mobile device made rational logic. Secondly, the
sample size of this research study could have been larger. Future research on this topic
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should utilize a larger sample size considering the number of constructs utilized in this
research study.
Finally, the participants who responded to this research study were limited to the U.S.A.
Thus, the conclusions of this study may apply to one country only and may not be illustrative
of all the countries and regions. The participants from one country may have also been less
culturally diverse than the sample collected from multiple countries.
Implications
The results of this research study have provided significant insinuations for theory and
practice.
Contributions to Theory
This research study makes a number of academic contributions in the realm of social
engineering research. First and foremost, it provided valuable evidence of using PMT to
understand the intricacies of social engineering. Social engineering attacks revolve around
how users think, decide, behave, and respond. Once a social engineer has a comprehensive
understanding of users’ behavior, it is easy to betray them. PMT provided a suitable
framework for the users' protection motivation and protection behavior. There was a dearth
of PMT theory-backed empirical investigation in the social engineering area. Henceforth, this
research study enlarged PMT usage to a comparatively unutilized sphere of social
engineering in the information security area.
Secondly, this research study examined the full nomology of the PMT model and not just
the partial PMT model for the social engineering area. Much prior research applying PMT to
information security did not incorporate the full nomology of the PMT model and did not
include the critical component of fear appeal (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). For this
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reason, this research study exhibited that PMT full nomology utilization, including fear
appeal, is necessary (Boss et al., 2015).
Thirdly, this research study incorporated the protection behavior in addition to protection
motivation and thus posited that preventing social engineering breach goes beyond protection
motivation, demonstrating the relevance of protection behavior. Previous research focused on
users' protection motivation in various areas, including viruses, threats, unauthorized access,
disruptions, attacks, malware, and spyware (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Mahmood, Siponen, Straub,
Rao, & Raghu, 2010). However, prior research recommended that researching actual
behavior is more vital than motivation (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Crossler et al., 2013).
Incorporating protection behavior and motivation gave the complete picture of the high
priority issue of social engineering breaches (Boss et al., 2015).
Finally, this research study combined the full nomology of the PMT model with the SETA
program and security policies for the social engineering area. Social engineering fortification
begins with the SETA program and security policies so that collective awareness progresses.
The SETA program trains users to make clever security decisions and helps users exhibit
specific behavior resulting in a diminution in social engineering breaches. By combining the
SETA program and security policies into the traditional PMT model, this research study
undertook significant aspects to bridge the gap of leveraging PMT in social engineering
research and overall information security research.
Contributions to Practice
Social engineering breaches have become so prevalent that organizations are in dire need
of assistance to prevent an implausible amount of monetary loss. Social engineering has
shown itself to be an efficacious mode for a criminal to get the keys of the kingdom. Social
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engineering is dangerous because it relies on user error and not technology error, as it is
trickier to predict user error. Henceforth, users should be cognizant of social engineering, be
accustomed to frequently used maneuvers, and know how to respond to them appropriately.
This research study may help organizations build mechanisms that foster protection
motivation to prevent compliance with information systems security policies and processes.
A better understanding of users’ information security protection behavior to prevent social
engineering breaches helps organizations formulate broader and better training programs,
policies, and processes.
Organizations’ goal is to have users understand who and what to trust. Likewise,
organizations must be on top of having a comprehensive SETA program and ensuring that
the SETA program regularly encompasses emerging trends. Therefore, this research study
has provided in-depth information about increasing users' protection behavior to prevent
social engineering breaches. The findings of this research study may help information
security leaders reinforce and upsurge organizations' resilience and prevent violations and
break-ins.
Recommendations
All participants of this research study were from the U.S.A. This research study may
produce variations in the results in other countries and regions of the world. Hence, the
recommendations included conducting a replica of this research study in other areas of the
world. A future research study should retest the questionnaire with samples from other
countries to identify alterations across countries. Forthcoming studies should deliberate
collecting data based on culture, as there is a possibility of finding a new outlook based on
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such criteria. Additionally, future research on this topic should employ a larger sample size
because of the number of constructs used in this research study.
Conclusion and Thesis Summary
Contemporary information security research has begun to focus more on human behavior
in preventing security breaches than the traditional approach of technological angle. Social
engineering entails manipulating users into disclosing confidential information or conducting
actions to achieve illegal financial gains. Social engineering breaches have become so
widespread that organizations and governments worldwide are facing severe unprecedented
financial loss. The social engineering area has been deficient in theory-grounded empirical
research.
This research study used the full nomology of PMT (Rogers, 1975) and social engineering
literature to empirically inspect how threat appraisal, coping appraisal, SETA program, and
security policies impact user's protection motivation and protection behavior to prevent social
engineering breaches. Threat appraisal and coping appraisal both impact protection
motivation. The threat appraisal evaluated the severity of the threat and scrutinized how
severe the danger is. The coping appraisal demonstrated how users replied to the threat.
The research model was established based on the original research question and in-depth
literature review. Data collection included web-based survey completion by one hundred
twenty-nine participants from the U.S.A. Successful evaluation of the research model using
PLS-SEM preceded with a practical Delphi study and data screening.
Protection motivation theory is a theory that initially elucidated fear appeals (Rogers,
1975). All three hypotheses related to fear were supported, which is a significant contribution
considering a lesser-explored fear appeal in prior research utilizing PMT. Furthermore, the
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research study verified positive impacts of perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, fear,
response efficacy, protection motivation, and the SETA program.
The conclusions of this research study have provided significant insinuations for research
and practice. It demonstrated that PMT is a valued model for predicting users' protection
behavior to prevent social engineering breaches. At the same time, one of the essential
factors in information security research is to combine multiple angles to elucidate emerging
phenomena and solve critical problems. This research study benefits organizations in
transforming security posture from reactive to proactive by improving users’ behaviors.
Overall, this research study has shown significant implications to the theory and practice in
social engineering. Finally, this research study has propositioned insight into social
engineering and information security while finding groundwork to provide future research.

93

Appendices

94

Appendix A
Summary of Measurement Items
Construct

Description

Reference

Perceived Severity

PS01

If I were to experience information security
compromise due to social engineering breach, I would
suffer much pain.

Boss et al.,
2015

PS02

If I were to experience information security
compromise due to social engineering breach, it
would be severe.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

PS03

If I were to experience information security
compromise due to social engineering breach, it
would be serious.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

PS04

If I were to lose data due to social engineering breach,
it would be significant.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

PS05

Having my data destroyed by social engineering
breach would be a serious problem for me.

Yoon et al.,
2012

Perceived Vulnerability
PV01

I am likely to experience information security
compromise due to social engineering breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

PV02

My chances of losing sensitive data in the future are
high due to social engineering breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

PV03

There is a chance that my personal information has
been disclosed due to social engineering breach.

Yoon et al.,
2012

PV04

My data is likely to be undermined by malicious
software such as viruses during social engineering
breaches.

Yoon et al.,
2012
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PV05

My system is likely to be damaged by a social
engineering breach.

Workman et
al., 2008

FE01

I am worried about the experience of information
security compromise due to social engineering
breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

FE02

I am frightened about the experience of information
security compromise due to social engineering
breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

FE03

I am anxious about the experience of information
security compromise due to social engineering
breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

FE04

I am scared about the experience of information
security compromise due to social engineering
breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

FE05

My computer might become unusable as a result of
information security compromise due to social
engineering breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

Fear

Maladaptive Rewards
MR01

Not complying with information security measures to
prevent social engineering breaches saves me time.

Boss et al.,
2015

MR02

Not complying with information security measures to
prevent social engineering breaches saves me money.

Boss et al.,
2015

MR03

Not complying with information security measures to
prevent social engineering breaches keeps me from
being confused.

Boss et al.,
2015

MR04

MR05

Not complying with information security measures to
prevent social engineering breaches would make it
easier to use other programs on my computer.
Not complying with information security measures to
prevent social engineering breaches would make it
easier to use the functionality of my Internet browser.

Boss et al.,
2015
Boss et al.,
2015
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Response Efficacy
RE01

Complying with information security measures is a
good way to reduce the risk of social engineering
breaches.

Boss et al.,
2015

RE02

If I were to comply with information security
measures, I would reduce my social engineering
breach chances.

Boss et al.,
2015

RE03

Information security measure works for protection
against social engineering breach.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

RE04

Information security measure is effective for
protection against social engineering breach.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

RE05

When complying with information security measures,
data is more likely to be protected against social
engineering breaches.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

SE01

Information security measures to prevent social
engineering breaches are easy to use.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

SE02

Information security measures to prevent social
engineering breaches are convenient to use.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

SE03

I am able to use Information security measures to
prevent social engineering breaches without much
effort.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

SE04

I have the necessary skills to protect myself from
information security violations.

Workman et
al., 2008

SE05

For me, taking information security precautions is
easy.

Workman et
al., 2008

Self-efficacy

97

Response Cost
RC01

The cost of complying with information security
measures to prevent social engineering breaches
outweighs the benefits.

Boss et al.,
2015

RC02

I would be discouraged from complying with
information security measures to prevent social
engineering breaches because it would take too much
time.

Boss et al.,
2015

RC03

Taking the time to comply with information security
measures to prevent social engineering breaches
would cause many problems.

Boss et al.,
2015

RC04

I would be discouraged from complying with
information security measures to prevent social
engineering breaches because I would feel silly doing
so.

Boss et al.,
2015

RC05

The inconvenience of implementing recommended
security measures to prevent social engineering
breaches outweighs the benefits.

Workman et
al., 2008

ST01

My organization delivers training to help employees
improve their awareness of computer and information
security issues.

Al-Omari, ElGayar, &
Deokar, 2012

ST02

My organization educates employees on the
appropriate use of information technology
resources.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

ST03

My organization briefs employees on the
consequences of modifying computerized data in an
unauthorized way.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

ST04

My organization trains employees on their computer
security responsibilities.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

ST05

My organization educates employees on their
responsibilities for managing computer
passwords.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

SETA Program
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Security Policies
SP01

My organization has prescribed rules and regulations
to prevent information security compromise due to
social engineering breaches.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

SP02

My organization's security policies prescribe my
responsibilities toward preventing information
security compromise.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

SP03

My organization has a formal policy that forbids
employees from modifying computerized data in an
unauthorized way.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

SP04

My organization has a formal policy that forbids
employees from installing their software on work
computers.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

SP05

My organization has specific guidelines that describe
the acceptable use of computer passwords.

Al-Omari et
al., 2012

Protection Motivation
PM01

I intend to comply with information security measures
to prevent social engineering breaches during the next
three months.

Boss et al.,
2015; Johnston
& Warkentin,
2010

PM02

I predict I will comply with information security
measures to prevent social engineering breaches
during the next three months.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

PM03

I plan to comply with information security measures
to prevent social engineering breaches during the
next three months.

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

PM04

I will take precautions against information security
violations during the next three months.

Yoon et al.,
2012

PM05

I will not install unreliable software on my computer
during the next three months.

Yoon et al.,
2012
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Protection Behavior
PB01

I intermittently check and remove viruses and
malicious software.

Yoon et al.,
2012

PB02

I immediately remove suspicious e-mails without
reading them.

Yoon et al.,
2012

PB03

Under no circumstances would I ever share anyone
my ID, password, or any other credentials.

Yoon et al.,
2012

PB04

I ensure the execution of the latest tools and
technologies on my devices per recommended
information security measures.

Liang & Xue,
2010

PB05

I do not proceed with any activity that I suspect can
cause a social engineering breach (for example, using
an unsecured internet connection).

Self-developed
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Appendix B
Summary of Reliability Evidence
Construct

Reference

Reliability Evidence

Perceived Severity
Perceived Severity
Perceived Severity
Perceived Vulnerability
Perceived Vulnerability
Perceived Vulnerability
Fear
Maladaptive Rewards
Response Efficacy
Response Efficacy
Self-efficacy
Self-efficacy
Response Cost
Response Cost
SETA Program
Security Policies
Protection Motivation
Protection Motivation
Protection Motivation
Protection Behavior
Protection Behavior

Boss et al., 2015
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010
Yoon et al., 2012
Boss et al., 2015
Yoon et al., 2012
Workman et al., 2008
Boss et al., 2015
Boss et al., 2015
Boss et al., 2015
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010
Workman et al., 2008
Boss et al., 2015
Workman et al., 2008
Al-Omari et al., 2012
Al-Omari et al., 2012
Boss et al., 2015
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010
Yoon et al., 2012
Yoon et al., 2012
Liang & Xue, 2010

.915
.943
.86
.817
.83
.854
.755
.777
.898
.897
.942
.929
.845
.793
.846
.787
.984
.954
.85
.77
.92
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Appendix C
IRB Approval

102

Appendix D
Participant Email Message
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Appendix E
Participant Survey

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

Appendix F
Mahalanobis Distance and Stem & Leaf Plot
Descriptives
Mahalanobis Distance

Mean
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean

Statistic
54.5736434
51.7482300

Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound

Std. Error
1.42793504

57.3990569

5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis

53.2411465
51.9612901
263.031
16.21822444
23.44277
112.42643
88.98366
16.04851
1.340
2.724

0.213
0.423

Extreme Values

Mahalanobis Distance

Highest

Lowest

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

Case Number
65
33
71
93
11
48
9
101
72
29

Value
112.42643
110.96614
105.27385
100.96868
100.10160
23.44277
28.15799
30.28290
30.52780
30.94282

119

Mahalanobis
Distance

Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
Sig.
Statistic
df
Sig.
0.109
129
0.001
0.903
129
0.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
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Mahalanobis Distance Stem-and-Leaf Plot
Frequency

Stem & Leaf

1.00
1.00
7.00
8.00
16.00
24.00
16.00
20.00
14.00
8.00
4.00
1.00
2.00
7.00

2. 3
2. 8
3 . 0001234
3 . 56778889
4 . 0011111122234444
4 . 555555566667777788888899
5 . 0000111122334444
5 . 55566677788888889999
6 . 00000112233334
6 . 56666888
7 . 1124
7. 7
8 . 02
Extremes (>=93)

Stem width:
Each leaf:

10.00000
1 case(s)

121

122

Appendix G
Return of Mahalanobis Distance and Stem & Leaf Plot after removal of 5 extreme values
Descriptives
Mahalanobis Distance

Mean
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean

Statistic
54.5564516
52.4025710

Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound

Std. Error
1.08812698

56.7103323

5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis

54.1137729
53.8557106
146.819
12.11686929
30.64232
99.40180
68.75949
15.97395
0.645
1.453

0.217
0.431

Extreme Values

Mahalanobis Distance

Highest

Lowest

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

Case Number
42
109
112
67
84
96
9
68
28
46

Value
99.40180
96.66706
80.92948
80.09708
75.32278
30.64232
30.67283
33.60169
33.64770
33.89013
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Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
Sig.
Statistic
df
Sig.
Mahalanobis
0.052
124
.200*
0.968
124
0.005
Distance
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
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Mahalanobis Distance Stem-and-Leaf Plot
Frequency

Stem & Leaf

5.00
7.00
17.00
13.00
22.00
20.00
19.00
11.00
5.00
1.00
2.00
2.00

3 . 00333
3 . 5677789
4 . 00000112222333344
4 . 5666788999999
5 . 0000000111111122233344
5 . 55555667777778889999
6 . 0000111122222233334
6 . 55666677778
7 . 01224
7. 5
8 . 00
Extremes (>=97)

Stem width:
Each leaf:

10.00000
1 case(s)

125

126

Appendix H
Normality and Scatter Plot
Model Summaryb

Model
1

R
.814a

R Square
0.662

Adjusted R
Square
0.629

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
0.611722

a. Predictors: (Constant), ST, RC, Case ID, SP, SE, PS, PV, MR, FE, RE,
PM
b. Dependent Variable: PB

ANOVAa
Model
1 Regression

Sum of
Squares
82.064

df
11

Mean Square
7.460

Residual
41.911
112
0.374
Total
123.975
123
a. Dependent Variable: PB
b. Predictors: (Constant), ST, RC, Case ID, SP, SE, PS, PV, MR, FE, RE, PM

F
19.937

Sig.
.000b
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128
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Appendix I
Additional Comments
Comments
number

Comments Description

1

I am always watchful about my passwords. A weak or lost password is
one of the biggest reasons for a security breach. I have seen people
sharing the same password for multiple systems; or sharing the same
password for their work accounts and personal accounts. Some people
use a file on their computer to store all the passwords, which is a
problem.

2

I wish my organization had a robust training program to increase
awareness among employees.

3

My company runs phishing breach drills. Phishing is one of the most
frquent types of social engineering. Phishing simulation tracks users
who are clicking on the links, users who do nothing, and intelligent
enough to report to the security group. It benefits us in testing how well
employees are following security procedures. The employees who fail to
respond as per the expectations are trained further.

4

I try to keep myself up-to-date with the emerging trends. Awareness is
the key here. The best way to combat any information security crimes is
for companies to educate their employees to recognize social
engineering tricks and techniques successfully. The content publication
and education strategy should consider different approaches as different
people consume information in different ways.

5

I make sure that I have antivirus running on all my personal devices.
Good antivirus software should be able to flag malicious messages and
suspicious websites. It not only just protects from viruses but also spam
and ads. It provides protection from removable devices like USBs.

6

We all click on links that promise to give us something for free and look
too good to be true. Reputed organizations generally do not contact
people directly to lure them.

7

My company is now learning to focus on giving employees the
knowledge and skills to spot security attacks. The biggest problem for
an organization's data defense is its people. Many organizations do not
realize this.
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8

I am a big proponent of cultivating a cyber-secure mindset. Social
engineering is about finding out what makes people act without
thinking. Social engineering causes 22% of all data breaches. Do not let
employees fall victim to the attackers.

9

I feel that everyone should be interested and engaged in building
security awareness in a company. It is about building a cyber-aware
culture. Just one incident is enough for an attacker to compromise a
company.

10

I am cautious about these things: 1) How I use email 2) What links I
click on 3) What websites I browse. 4) What Internet I use other than
my home Internet. 5) Do not share confidential information. 6) Destroy
important papers before disposing of them. 7) What files I download.
No one is immune from security breaches, and hackers are moving at
light speed. Criminals' sophistication level has increased, and they are
using artificial intelligence and machine learning to build patterns and
improve their tactics. Everything is a target, including credit cards, bank
accounts, financial reports, user passwords, employee information, and
intellectual properties.

11

I experienced social engineering where an attacker impersonated my
CFO and asked to do a wire transfer.

12

I cross-check that online content is from trustworthy sources. If I receive
content from external sources, I check that it is safe to consume.

13

I feel that it is a good idea to check everything every time. It is like
having a strategy to trust no one.

14

My company is a small startup, and we do not have a single full-time
employee staffed to manage security issues.

15

I am mindful of the process of employees' authority to wire payments
and do electronic fund transfers. I demand extra scrutiny of international
wires.

16

I do not open attachments from unidentified sources.

17

We experienced an attack where we lost control over all the servers and
all my organization's applications. It was dangerous and took us several
days to be back to normal. We overhauled our security program after
learning our lesson.
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18

I watch out for suspicious emails. I have observed spelling and grammar
mistakes in phishing emails. On the contrary, I have also seen perfect
emails without any mistakes. I have noticed that phishing emails often
demand urgent actions.

19

I believe that every organization's biggest problem is cybercrime. In
large organizations, not everyone knows everyone. Hackers spend much
of their time before the attack researching, and they are looking to take
advantage of the employees who are eager to help. I help employees
realize and visualize how information can be exploited.

20

I think it is vital to stop emails that cause information security attacks.
All email systems provide spam filter functionality. I set the spam filter
option to high to keep the suspicious emails out of access. I balance it by
checking the spam folder so that spam folders do not have genuine
emails. I get many emails that are spam.

21

I have seen people getting calls from hackers pretending to be a Help
Desk person from their company. I am continually alert with all
incoming calls to ensure that they are from a trusted source.

22

Never reveal passwords.

23

In general, breaches happen due to either technical problems or user
problems. Cyberattacks are mainly network-based or social-based.
Network attacks involve acquiring unauthorized access through
applications or infrastructure. Social attacks involve social engineering
to tricking people into gaining unauthorized access to information. I
have learned from my experience where someone contacted me posing
as my antivirus software company account representative.

24

I have engaged with an external vendor who provides cybersecurity
solutions to my small business.

25

As a Global CISO, the best advice I can give is to make information
security training a regular activity.

26

Our executive leadership understands the value and supports the
program. Our program is checked with the auditors and regulators to
assess if we are doing the right thing.

27

My company did a security campaign. However, it was "one and done".
A one-time program is not good enough for the employees to
continuously make a more thoughtful selection.
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28

Be careful with everything in today's time. If someone offers a free
iPhone, then be suspicious. No one is going to provide a free iPhone to
an unknown person without any reason.

29

I am constantly cautious not to get free Wi-Fi.
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